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Summary of study   
Poor clinical insight (i.e. insight of illness) is considered a characteristic feature of 
schizophrenia. It is central for determining the presence of mental disorder and its prognosis, 
as well as for prescribing appropriate treatment and management. Patients with schizophrenia 
and other psychotic disorders suffer markedly from distorted beliefs. Yet, insight of illness 
does not specifically address the patient’s capacity to evaluate these disruptions. Evaluation 
of own anomalous beliefs and recognition of incorrect conclusions can be conceptualized as 
cognitive insight and assessed with Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS).  
 Lack of clinical insight may also be a major problem in psychotic disorders other than 
schizophrenia. Studies comparing levels of insight across diagnostic groups have not found 
substantial differences between patients with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Notably, the 
insight questionnaires used in these studies were not validated for patients with bipolar 
disorders. This also applies to the scale measuring clinical insight in this study, the 
Birchwood Insight Scale (IS). The first part of this thesis focuses on methodological issues 
regarding these questionnaires. In study I acceptable psychometric properties were found for 
the IS when applied to patients with schizophrenia and bipolar I disorder. However, for 
patients with bipolar II disorder the scale seemed to work poorly. Findings in the original 
BCIS study (Beck et al., 2004) suggested that the scale was able to differentiate between 
depressive patients with and without psychosis. We found that the psychometric properties 
were acceptable for the bipolar disorder group as well as the schizophrenia group. The scores 
of healthy controls, however, cannot be compared to patient scores without excluding items 
referring to psychotic experiences. Furthermore, the two BCIS subscales, self-reflectiveness 
and self-certainty, showed low or moderate correlation for all the three groups, indicating that 
they represent two different dimensions of cognitive insight. High scores on self-
reflectiveness and low scores on self-certainty were considered as normal. 
 In the second part of the thesis the relationships between cognitive insight and clinical 
characteristics were explored. An association was found between self-certainty and delusions,  
in line with findings in the few previous studies. Furthermore, we explored the relationship 
between cognitive insight and different constellations of psychotic symptoms (delusions 
and/or hallucinations). Delusions irrespective of the presence or absence of hallucinations 
were associated with low self-reflectiveness and high self-certainty, reflecting low cognitive 
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insight. In contrast, a subgroup of patients with solitary hallucinations showed high cognitive 
insight, which is quite interesting for understanding hallucinations but needs replication.  
The relationship between cognitive insight and neurocognition was also studied 
within the framework of this thesis. Consistent with a study on patients with first episode 
psychosis we found that low self-certainty is associated with high IQ and verbal learning. 
Verbal learning made a specific contribution in explaining self-certainty also when potential 
confounders were taken into account. 
Taken together, the present thesis suggests that both clinical and cognitive insight 
could be measured with self-report questionnaires in schizophrenia and bipolar I disorder. 
Further, it suggests that hallucinations are related to better cognitive insight, and delusions 
with worse cognitive insight, and that low cognitive insight is associated with high IQ and 
low verbal learning. This indicates that cognitive insight is an important concept in 
understanding the psychopathology of psychotic symptoms.   
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1  Introduction              
1.1  Unresolved issues in insight  
Insight of illness is an important aspect in diagnostics and treatment of patients with 
psychosis. Focus has primarily been on lack of insight in patients with schizophrenia, yet, 
poor insight seems to be a major problem also in patients with other psychotic illnesses, as 
well as bipolar disorder. Insight of illness is considered a multidimensional concept 
distributed on a continuum. A delineation by Anthony David (1990) is widely used: “Insight 
of illness in psychosis encompasses the patient’s awareness of symptoms as abnormal, 
attributing symptoms to a mental disorder and recognizing the need for treatment…”. Aaron 
T. Beck later labeled insight of illness as clinical insight. In addition to attenuated insight of 
illness, patients with psychosis often have reduced capacity to reflect rationally on their 
anomalous experiences and to recognize when their conclusions are incorrect. Beck termed 
such insight cognitive insight.  
As cognitive insight addresses the patient’s own interpretation of psychotic 
experiences and appraises the possibility of being mistaken, it differs conceptually from 
clinical insight. Cognitive insight in patients with psychosis encompasses decision-making 
processes and builds on the principles of cognitive theory and Cognitive Behavioral Therapy 
(CBT). Patients with schizophrenia with some awareness of the possibility of being mistaken 
seem to improve more after CBT aimed at psychotic symptoms than patients without this 
“chink of insight” (Garety et al., 2000). Consistent with this finding middle-aged and older 
patients with schizophrenia receiving (cognitive behavioral) social skills training improved 
their cognitive insight more than patients receiving “treatment as usual” (Granholm et al., 
2005). More research, however, is needed to answer whether cognitive insight can predict 
treatment response in patients with schizophrenia.  
 Cognitive insight is assessed with Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS). The question 
of applicability of the scale to different clinical populations is pertinent. Beck and colleagues 
found that the questionnaire could distinguish between depressed patients with and without 
psychosis (Beck et al., 2004). Further, the scale was found to have acceptable psychometric 
properties for middle-aged and old patients with schizophrenia (Pedrelli et al., 2004). 
Though, the applicability of the scale for other psychotic disorders is not known. Can the 
BCIS be applied to patients with bipolar I disorder? How is the applicability of the self-report 
in non-clinical populations? As cognitive insight entails appraisal of the psychotic 
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experience, its relationship to central features of psychosis, delusions and hallucinations, as 
well as neurocognition, should be explored.  
 
 
1.2  Schizophrenia 
Although there is no pathognomonic sign or symptom of schizophrenia, a cluster of 
symptoms occur frequently in the disorder. Symptoms in schizophrenia are commonly 
divided into positive and negative, which respectively are based on the occurrence of 
productive or deficit signs of the disturbance (Crow, 1981). The positive symptom dimension 
(i.e. psychosis), encompasses delusions and hallucinations, whereas the negative symptom 
dimension comprises affect flattening, poverty of speech, lack of motivation and social 
withdrawal. A third category, disorganized symptoms, consists of symptoms related to 
disorganization of speech and behavior (Liddle, 1987b). Negative symptoms are more stable 
than positive symptoms and are the least likely to improve over the course of the illness 
(Addington and Addington, 1991). The current diagnostic systems of mental disorders, based 
on the work by Emil Kraepelin (Kraepelin, 1919) and Kurt Schneider (Schneider, 1959), rely 
on clinical descriptions of such presented symptoms and elimination of the most probable 
differentials such as drug abuse, neurological conditions, or metabolic illness (First and 
Tasman, 2004). According to the DSM-IV classification of diagnoses continuous signs of the 
disorder must persist for at least 6 months and there must be a manifest social or occupational 
decline.  
 A hallucination is a perception when in fact nothing exists in the perceptual field, in 
other words, a perception without an object. Hallucinations can be divided into various types 
according to modality, timing with respect to sleep, their occasional precipitation by a 
sensory stimulus and their content. The auditory modality of hallucinations is most common 
in schizophrenia. The mean lifetime prevalence of hallucinations is approximately 60 % 
among patients with the disorder (Slade and Bentall, 1988).  
 Delusions can be delineated as (DSM-IV): “A false personal belief based on incorrect 
inference about external reality and firmly sustained in spite of what almost everyone else 
believes and in spite of what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the 
contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture 
or sub-culture. When a false belief involves an extreme value judgment, it is regarded as a 
 11 
 
delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility”. Delusions occur at 
some stage of the condition in more than 90% of the patients. In a meta analysis positive 
symptoms, negative symptoms and disorganized symptoms were all weakly to moderately 
associated with insight of illness (Mintz et al., 2003). Moreover, there is an association 
between intact insight of illness and depression. Suicidal ideation seems to increase with 
improvement in insight (Schwartz and Petersen, 1999; Schwartz, 2000) but no consistent 
association has been found between insight of illness and suicidal behaviour or suicide 
(Amador et al., 1996). Empirical studies suggest that insight of illness predicts time to 
symptomatic resolution (van Os et al., 1996) and also predicts improvement in psychosocial 
functioning (Schwartz et al., 1997).  
Cognitive impairment in patients with schizophrenia has been reported since the 
illness was first described by Bleuler. Neurocognition is moderately to severely impaired in 
patients with schizophrenia (Keefe et al., 2006). The severity of impairments is greatest in the 
domains of memory, attention, working memory, problem solving, processing speed and 
social cognition (Sadock et al., 2009). Impairments in cognitive functioning is associated 
with negative and disorganized dimensions (Liddle, 1987a; Liddle and Morris, 1991; O'Leary 
et al., 2000), but not associated with psychotic symptoms (i.e. delusions and hallucinations) 
(Bilder et al., 1985; Cuesta and Peralta, 1995; O'Leary et al., 2000).  
 Schizophrenia has a high heritability (approx. 80 %) and is on a group level associated 
with demonstrable alterations in brain structure such as subtle decrease in gray matter  
volume, enlargements of ventricles and focal alterations of white matter (Vita et al., 2006; 
Glahn et al., 2008). Neurochemical imaging studies have consistently demonstrated that 
schizophrenia, in its acute state, is associated with an increase in dopamine synthesis and in 
certain brain areas release, as well as increased resting-state synaptic dopamine 
concentrations (Guillin et al., 2007). These changes in dopamine transmission are related to 
the clinical manifestations of delusions and hallucinations (van Os and Kapur, 2009). 
Pharmacological agents which block the dopamine systems are effective in treatment of  
psychotic symptoms, but less effective on negative symptoms and cognitive impairment 
(Kapur et al., 2006).  
 The likelihood that individuals develop schizophrenia during their lifetime is 0.4 - 1.0 
% with an average of 0.7 (van Os and Kapur, 2009) with an incidence and prevalence 
depending on strict or wide criteria. Age of onset varies widely across large parts of early 
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adulthood, peaking in males during late adolescence to early adulthood and in females in 
their mid to late twenties.  
Decline of psychosocial functioning is one of the defining characteristics of 
schizophrenia. Individuals with schizophrenia face major difficulties in a variety of aspects of 
everyday life. Their problems in holding a job, initiating or staying in partnerships and 
difficulties keeping friends reflect fundamental problems with social interaction. Most of the 
reduction in social functioning occurs during the early illness stages of schizophrenia 
(McGorry et al., 1996). The course of illness shows, on the one hand, extensive inter-
individual differences, and on the other hand, a large degree of intra-individual stability in the 
case of remission after the first episode of psychosis. 
 
  
1.3  Bipolar disorder 
The cardinal symptoms of bipolar disorder are discrete periods of abnormal mood and 
activation that define depressive, manic or hypomanic episodes. The DSM-IV definition is 
based on the identification of individual mood episodes occurring over time. Individuals who 
experience the combination of major depressive episodes and mania are diagnosed with 
bipolar I disorder, and individuals who experience the combination of major depressive 
episodes and hypomania are diagnosed with bipolar II disorder. A hypomanic episode is not 
severe enough to cause marked impairment in social and occupational functioning, or to 
necessitate hospitalization, and psychotic symptoms do not occur. In mania, however, such 
impairment occurs, potentially combined with hospitalization and psychotic symptoms. In 
accordance with the definition the key differentiating feature between a manic and a 
hypomanic episode is the impact of symptoms on social or occupational functioning, as well 
as the duration. Research on the structure of manic episodes indicates that they appear with 
similar presentations if and when they reoccur (Goodwin, 2007).  
 Results from a recent survey estimates that the life-time prevalence is 1.0 % for 
bipolar I disorder and 1.1 % for bipolar II disorder (Merikangas et al., 2007). The mean age at 
onset varies with the definition applied (definition of onset), ranging from the appearance of 
first symptoms before the age of 20 to the first hospitalization in the age interval 25-30 years. 
A recent study found that mean age at onset defined as the start of the first affective episode 
was 23 years (Larsson et al., 2009). 
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 Several studies have shown that insight is impaired in bipolar disorder, and 
specifically in the manic phase (Michalakeas et al., 1994; Ghaemi et al., 1995; Swanson, Jr. 
et al., 1995; Peralta and Cuesta, 1998). The results in a small meta-analysis by Ghaemi and 
Rosenquist suggested  that insight of illness in mania could be a state phenomenon.   
 
1.4  Clinical insight in psychosis 
1.4.1  General aspects   
Thoughts and ideas of an individual suffering from a psychotic disorder may seem incoherent 
and lacking in rationality. Despite the efforts of family members and clinicians explaining 
that the patient has a mental disorder and consequently is in need of treatment patients 
frequently appear indifferent or unaware of the illness. Such lack of a consensual perspective 
may impose frustration among next to kin and professionals. Yet, for the person being 
diagnosed who may also be certain that he/she does not suffer from a serious mental illness 
the issue may inflict great distress. Lack of insight of illness with its profound effect on the 
therapeutic relationship is frequently observed in schizophrenia and other psychotic illnesses 
such as bipolar disorder.  
Insight has acquired a number of meanings and the usage is broad. Consequentially, it 
is important to clarify the terminology used in relation to insight. The definition in the 
Advanced Oxford English Dictionary is: “understanding, power of seeing into something 
with the mind or a (often sudden) perception or glimpse”. The general usage of insight of 
illness in the health care system, and this also applies to patients with psychosis, refers to a 
state of mind or mental act in which the patient is aware of being ill. Obviously, insight of 
illness is complex, and by some theorists described as kaleidoscopic in nature. To date no 
universally used definition of insight of illness has been delineated. Markova and Berrios 
postulated that insight of illness is a composite construct (i.e. comprising not only the 
phenomenon of insight, but also constructions by the patient, the clinician, and the interactive 
process itself) which also contributes to the shaping of the final contract (Markova and 
Berrios, 1995). In keeping with this is the notion that the construct insight of illness 
represents a phenomenon which consider something being presented or assessed 
(epistemological viewpoint) rather than something that is actually happening (ontological 
viewpoint). The usage of insight of illness in this dissertation will be confined to the former 
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construct. It is beyond the scope of the thesis to further review the theoretical background of 
clinical insight.  
The observed lack of recognition of being ill has been given many names, such as 
poor insight, insightlessness, unawareness of illness, clinical insight, attitude towards illness, 
sealing over, defensive denial etc. Such terms often imply particular positions regarding the 
etiology of deficits or explanation of insight within a particular school of thought or 
therapeutic tradition (e.g. denial as defense in psychodynamic psychiatry). The next 
subsection addresses different perspectives of clinical insight. The terms insight of illness and 
clinical insight are considered to be synonymous and will be used interchangeably in the text 
throughout the thesis. Clinical insight will be distinguished from cognitive insight.  
 
1.4.2   Historical and current perspectives 
The notion that insanity equals the presence of delusions persisted until the first part of the 
18th century (Berrios, 1994). “Lack of insight” was, on the other hand, used synonymously 
with insanity. Until the eighteenth century the view on insanity was a reflection of what has 
been called the ontological definition of disease – being mad and losing one’s reason was a 
sort of permanent state that affected the entire person. “Partial insanity”, however, as viewed 
by theorists in the early nineteenth century could indicate a state of mind being “intermittent” 
and also “incomplete”. A deeper shift in the view of disease had made such a change in view 
possible. The French physician Philippe Pinel (1745 -1826), who was instrumental in the 
development of a more humane approach to the care of psychiatric patients, claimed that 
patients could be affected in some parts of their psyche, but not in other parts. These 
perspectives opened up for the later view: “an insanity that was aware of itself”. 
 The German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (1855-1926) distinguished between manic-
depressive psychosis and the disorder designated dementia praecox (Kraepelin, 1919), which 
later was renamed schizophrenia. The nosology was based on symptom patterns and the long-
term course of illness. Kraepelin categorized dementia praecox within the group of 
endogenous dementias and believed that the illness had a deteriorating course in which 
mental function continuously declined. In contrast to patients with dementia praecox he 
believed that patients suffering from manic-depressive psychosis experienced an intermittent 
course of illness with relatively symptom-free intervals between acute episodes. Dementia 
praecox was later relabeled schizophrenia (Bleuler, 1950) by the Swiss psychiatrist Eugen 
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Bleuler (1857-1939). He proposed the name to denote the lack of integration of different 
psychic functions’ (Gr. skhizo: to split, phren: mind). This was based on descriptions of 
patients who partially worked out their ideas and subsequently connected fragments of ideas 
in an illogical way. Bleuler considered schizophrenia as a group of psychotic diseases (group 
of schizophrenias) with variable course and prognosis, which at times were chronic, at times 
marked by intermittent attacks. Yet, he explicitly noted that the course of illness did not 
permit a full “restitutio ad integrum”. Bleuler made substantial contributions to the 
description of patients with psychosis and characterized insight in these patients as a 
phenomenon encompassing both inter and intraindividual differences: “We find all nuances 
from almost complete insight to complete misinterpretations of all situations- not only in 
different patients, but sometimes in the very same patient, occasionally changing from one 
moment to the next”. His description of autism (i.e. in the sense of a symptom in 
schizophrenia) is fundamental to the concept of clinical insight. Autistic thought content is 
considered incorrigible and assumes complete reality value for the patients, while actual 
reality value is minimized or reduced to zero. Bleuler explains, “The patient with 
schizophrenia is convinced that others believe him to be mentally healthy although daily he 
hears the very opposite from us. The patient does comprehend the sense of our words, can 
reproduce them, but immediately afterwards he substitutes his own meaning for that of ours 
because what we in reality have been telling him could not be brought into logic contact with 
his ideas. Depending on the circumstances the patient will displace or falsify reality” 
(Bleuler, 1950). Thus, Bleuler postulated the existence of two parallel pathways of thinking 
in the patient with schizophrenia which he labeled “double registration”.  
The German psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) introduced the 
“biographical method” in the examination of patients with mental illness (i.e. providing 
information on how the patients themselves felt about the symptoms as well as notes on the 
people concerned), which is fundamental to modern psychiatric practice. He observed that 
transient insight may occur in acute psychosis. According to Jaspers, insight was not lasting 
or complete. It was rather a relative phenomenon which should be expressed in relation to 
clinical features and remission. Nevertheless, he observed that patients who recovered from 
manic psychosis or alcoholic hallucinations were capable of looking back on their 
experiences with complete insight. Patients with schizophrenia, on the other hand, did not 
exhibit such overall insight and were unable to talk freely about their experiences, becoming 
overtly affected when told to do so (Jaspers, 1963). The patients’ ability to judge what was 
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happening to them and why this occurs played a central role in Jasper’s concept of insight. In 
keeping with this he conveyed the problem of “pseudo-insight” describing patients who 
essentially repeat what the therapist has said without a deeper understanding of their illness. 
Aubrey Lewis, an Australian physician and early researcher in psychiatric epidemiology, 
published the paper “The psychopathology of insight” in 1934 (Lewis, 1934). The paper had 
a profound impact on the issue of insight of illness at the time. He defined insight as:  
“The correct attitude to morbid change in oneself, and moreover, the realization that the 
illness is mental”. 
According to Lewis, insight of illness could be modular with the self as both object and 
subject. He also gave an early hint at the later elaborated notion of symptom attribution 
(defined by A. David in 1990). Lewis describes the struggle and the pain in individuals 
gaining insight and rejected the “all-or-nothing approach” which up to then had been widely 
clinically applied. He described insight in terms of both awareness of self-change and the 
judgment of such change. Pointing out that insight was judged by non-affected individuals 
and at the same time it was with a “disordered mind the patient contemplates his state or 
individual symptoms” Lewis insinuated the necessity of studying the whole psychopathology 
of the patient. At the time of Lewis’ publication gestalt therapists had a very different view 
on insight of illness, being concerned with the nature of insight in the sense of an intuitive 
understanding comparable with how a solution to a problem suddenly comes to mind. 
Psychodynamic approaches have mostly been applied to patients struggling with neurotic 
conflicts, pointing out the role of the unconscious defense in poor insight.  
During the last two decades several theorists have emphasized that insight of illness 
encompasses a complex concept representing a continuum of thinking and emotions affected 
by internal and external factors. Markova and Berrios postulated that the individual’s self-
knowledge and self-deception is essential to insight of illness (Markova and Berrios, 1992b). 
As insight is restricted to illness it is viewed as a subcategory of self-knowledge. The patient 
acquires such self-knowledge when the relationship between personal characteristics (e.g. 
personality attributes) and the mental illness is recognized. Hence, knowledge of the facts 
regarding the illness does not suffice to obtain insight proper, but is rather considered a 
prerequisite. Markova and Berrios suggested that the patient may not wish to gain proper 
insight because it could be too threatening to the self, bringing us to the question of self-
deception. Self-deception is a failure of acquiring self-knowledge and there are different 
views as to whether it represents a conscious or unconscious process. Such self-deception 
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entails a paradoxical state of holding such knowledge and yet lacking the knowledge at the 
same time. Patients with psychosis are out of touch with reality. Thus, it is incompatible for 
such individuals to possess self-knowledge. To take this one step further and explore the role 
of denial in terms of self-deception Moore et al. (1999) examined insight of illness, 
depression and self-deception (operationalized as the tendency to give self-reports that are 
subjectively honest, but positively biased) in schizophrenia (Moore et al., 1999). Patients with 
lack of insight showed relatively low depressive symptomatology and relatively high self-
deception. The findings suggest that the presence of depressive symptomatology in 
schizophrenia is related to the level of insight, and possibly partly contingent on the absence 
of self-deception as a denial defense. 
 
1.4.3  Definition and assessment 
After Lewis’ much cited paper from 1934 there were a number of attempts on assessment of 
insight. However, these authors were facing fundamental methodological problems. 
Definitions of insight of illness were either absent or overly simplistic, and in most instances 
no systematized measure was used. In 1990, Anthony David exerted a multidimensional 
definition, proposing that insight of illness is comprised of three overlapping dimensions: The 
recognition that one has a mental disorder, compliance with treatment and the ability to 
relabel unusual mental events, such as delusions and hallucinations, as pathological (David, 
1990). This definition has also received critique, mainly because it  fails to assess insight of 
illness as a whole (Markova and Berrios, 1992b). Nevertheless, it is by far the most used 
delineation of the construct and has to a large degree formed the basis for empirical research 
in the field over the past twenty years. An overview of the assessment of clinical insight will 
be presented (although not exhaustive) employing five modified categories of clinical 
instruments suggested by Amador and associates (Amador et al., 1991). 
Case reports based on in depth interviews regarding the patients’ beliefs about their illness 
were frequently used in the early literature on the topic. These were essentially subjective 
descriptions of the individuals’ psychotic experiences, describing whether or not the patients 
believed they were mentally ill. Restrictions were neither put on the patients’ responses nor 
on the investigators regarding categories of answers. This method has encouraged the 
generation of hypotheses as the investigator observes the patient and speaks to him/her, 
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therein opening up for new clinical descriptions. The lack of objectivity is a clear 
disadvantage to this method.  
Structured psychiatric interviews without standardized rating was introduced at a time when 
rather simplistic and imprecise definitions of poor insight were applied, for example: “verbal 
recognition by the patient of existing psychological difficulties” (Eskey, 1958). Scores were 
not adjusted to standardized rating. The patients would for instance be rated as having full, 
partial or no insight. In general these methods have been criticized for the lack of validity and 
difficulty in measuring finer gradations of insight.  
Structured psychiatric interviews with standardized rating represent the group of instruments 
presently most used. The first insight measure to be widely applied was “The Insight Scale 
and Treatment Attitudes Questionnaire” (ITAQ; McEvoy et al., 1981). Insight was assessed 
along two dimensions, the patient’s failure to acknowledge illness and the need for treatment. 
The patients were rated as having ‘good insight’, ‘partial insight’ or ‘no insight’. The main 
criticism of this scale has been that it failed to account for patients’ perception of specific 
symptoms of the disorder, such as cognitive processes, emotions and behavior (Markova and 
Berrios, 1992a). The attempt to measure insight along several dimensions was taken a step 
further with the Scale to assess Unawareness of Mental Disorder (SUMD; Amador et al., 
1993), which essentially builds on the definition by David. The scale uses a semi-structured 
interview and the insight scores are rated in reference to predetermined categories of answers. 
The scale was developed to assess current and retrospective awareness of having a mental 
disorder, the effects of medication, and the awareness and attributions for the specific signs 
and symptoms of the disorder, as well as the consequences of exhibiting these symptoms. The 
SUMD with its extensive composition of 72 items has been frequently used to assess the 
relationship between insight of illness and psychopathology. The Schedule to Assess Insight 
(SAI) measures awareness and acknowledgement of the illness, the need for treatment and 
also includes the assessment of attributions (e.g. the patient’s capacity to describe the 
psychotic symptoms as morbid) (David, 1990). The expanded version also encompasses the 
awareness of specific signs and symptoms. The insight item of the Positive and Negative 
Syndrome Scale (PANSS) has been widely used in insight research. The measure 
incorporates aspects from the three dimensions of insight into one – obviously a strength and 
a limitation. The extended usage is beneficial enabling comparison of results across studies.  
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The systematized scoring of free responses is a further category of insight assessment which 
encompasses a systematic interpretation of data. Patients’ responses are categorized, making 
comparisons between studies easier. The Present State Exam (PSE) which is used for rating 
signs and symptoms has a single insight item (Wing, 1974). The answer to the question: “Do 
you think there is anything the matter with you?” is rated after being compared with 
categories of insight composed when the investigation is completed. 
Self-reports are questionnaires comprised by several items which are rated by the patient in a 
multiple choice order. In Soskis’ and Bowers' self-report from 1969 patients indicated 
dichotomously whether the statements in the questionnaire could be applied to themselves or 
not (Soskis and Bowers, 1969). The first self-report to be extensively used in the insight of 
illness assessment was Birchwood Insight Scale (IS), which is based on three dimensions: 
Insight of illness, relabeling of symptoms and treatment needs. The 8 items of the inventory 
are scored on a four point Likert scale. The IS is one of the two self-reports used in the 
current work. The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) which addresses self-appraisal of 
unusual experiences and beliefs is also employed in the studies of this thesis. An advantage of 
self-reports is avoidance of potential rater bias such as the tendency to rate patients with low 
intelligence or poor communication skills as having poor insight (Marks et al., 2000). Patient 
response bias that could result from the presence of an examiner is also reduced. 
.6entityuicide Their parents ex 
1.4.4  Neurocognitive model 
A number of theoretical models have exerted to explain insight of illness. On the one end of a 
theoretical spectrum poor clinical insight has been considered a psychological defense 
mechanism and on the other extreme it has been thought to reflect a neurocognitive deficit.  
During the last two decades there has been increasing focus on poor insight of illness in 
schizophrenia as possibly resulting from neurocognitive impairments. It has been suggested 
that due to deficits in neurocognition, particularly impeded executive functions, individuals 
with schizophrenia may fail to recognize their symptoms and will not attribute them to the 
illness (Morgan and David, 2004). Hence, information processing failure may prevent 
individuals from comprehending their state in its totality and represent a source of poor 
insight. A body of literature has emerged on the relationship between insight of illness and 
neurocognition. In a meta-analysis small, although significant, positive relationships were 
found between insight of illness and all the assessed neurocognitive domains, and also 
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between insight of illness and general intellectual functioning in schizophrenia (Aleman et 
al., 2006). The much used dimensions of clinical insight labeled “illness awareness” and 
“insight in treatment needs” seem to be relatively weekly connected to neurocognition 
compared to the individuals capacity to relabel symptoms as pathological (Morgan and 
David, 2004). A suggested explanation is the possible association of the former two factors 
with social and cultural variation. Weiler and associates investigated insight of illness and 
symptom change in a longitudinal study and found that the relationship was relatively strong 
in schizophrenia patients with high symptom load. Patients with severe psychopathology 
showed fairly persistent lack of insight and the authors suggested that neurocognitive 
impairment and insight deficit could be related in subgroups of severely ill patients (Weiler et 
al., 2000). This notion has later gained some support, but further research, both cross-
sectional studies determining mediating factors and longitudinal studies are needed to acquire 
in depth knowledge on the relationship. 
 The neuropsychological model has suggested poor insight in schizophrenia to be 
related to frontal lobe dysfunction. Findings in structural neuroimaging studies  have shown 
reduced middle and superior frontal lobe volume in schizophrenia patients with poor insight 
of illness, and, thus, providing support for this model (Flashman et al., 2001) Theoretically, 
neuroanatomically based models have been outlined in neurological disorders, which may 
have relevance to schizophrenia. Unawareness of illness in patients with acquired brain 
lesions secondary to cerebral insults, as well as in patients with neurodegenerative disorders 
represent indirect clues for the understanding of the neural basis of unawareness of illness in 
schizophrenia (Amador et al., 1991). Anosognosia is a disorder in which the patient, affected 
by a brain dysfunction, does not recognize the presence or appreciate the severity of deficits 
in sensory, perceptual, motor, affective or cognitive functioning (Heilman et al., 1998). 
However, the previously postulated close association between global cognitive deficit and 
anosognosia (McGlynn and Schacter, 1989) does not seem to be supported by more recent 
data (Starkstein et al., 1992; Coslett, 2005). Cognitive dysfunction may rather be a 
predisposing factor or may lead to greater severity of anosognosia following stroke (Marcel 
et al., 2004; Vuilleumier, 2004). 
Empirical studies have consistently shown lesions in the right cerebral hemisphere in 
patients with anosognosia (Starkstein et al., 1992; Pia et al., 2004; Coslett, 2005; Karnath et 
al., 2005). Further, there seems to be an association between anosognosia for motor 
impairment and lesions of the fronto-parietal or fronto-parietal-temporal areas.  
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1.5  Cognitive insight in schizophrenia 
The founder of Cognitive Behavior Therapy (CBT), Aaron T. Beck, applied cognitive models 
of psychosis in explaining patients’ own evaluation of erroneous or unusual experiences. This 
perspective was termed cognitive insight and is assessed with the Beck Cognitive Insight 
Scale (BCIS), which is a key measure in the present work. In the following section, the 
background, assessment, method and previous use will be presented.  
 
1.5.1   A cognitive model of positive symptoms 
In the last two to three decades a consensus has developed that psychosis may occur in 
individuals with a vulnerable predisposition and that its onset often follows specific life 
events (Read et al., 2005; Hardy et al., 2005), adverse environments (Bebbington and 
Kuipers, 1994), illicit drug use (van Os and Kapur, 2009) or periods of isolation. Genetic 
factors may represent such vulnerability. Schizophrenia, the best characterized psychotic 
disorder in terms of genetics, shows large heritability (estimates of 0.8) and is considered a 
complex genetic disorder where environmental factors add to the disease risk (van Os and 
Kapur, 2009). Different stress-vulnerability models have been applied to explain the 
development of psychotic disorders. Cognitive models of psychosis attempt to link the steps 
between phenomenological experiences and such neurobiological, psychological and social 
predispositions. These models could be connecting theory, therapeutic approaches applied in 
clinical settings and also research on psychotherapy. Garety and colleagues found that 
patients with schizophrenia who confirmed the possibility of being mistaken and received 
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) had better outcomes than patients who did not approve 
and received CBT (Garety et al., 2000). These researchers developed a cognitive model 
comprising factors that contribute in the shaping and maintenance of psychotic symptoms. 
The model builds on work by other researchers (Hemsley, 1993; Morrison et al., 2000; 
Chadwick and Birchwood, 1994; Bentall et al., 1994) and entails concepts essential to 
cognitive therapy such as disruptions in automatic cognitive processes and maladaptive 
conscious appraisals (Garety et al., 2001).  
A number of potential empirical factors contribute to the formation and maintenance of 
the psychotic appraisal. Four factors, however, were particularly relevant as background 
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when Beck and associates developed the scale measuring reasoning and evaluation 
impairments in psychotic patients.  
 
 
1. Reasoning bias in patients with schizophrenia 
Reasoning biases which seem to contribute to formation of psychotic symptoms and thus are 
relevant to cognitive insight are ‘jumping to conclusions’ information gathering bias, 
externalizing attribution style and poor social understanding. The “jumping to conclusions” 
bias described by Garety, Helmsley and Wessely (Garety et al., 1991) may limit the amount 
of data to support an explanation, and seems to play a role in the early stage of delusional 
development in which a patient is considering whether or not to accept or reject a thought 
with a delusional content (Fine et al., 2007). Patients with persecutory delusions seem to 
excessively attribute hypothetical positive events to internal causes showing an exaggerated 
self-serving attributional bias when making inferences about hypothetical positive and 
negative events (Kaney and Bentall, 1989a; Candido and Romney, 1990). The attribution bias 
may yield a tendency to find external explanations for own idiosyncrasies. Limited capacity 
to read and understand the intentions of others is assumed to play a further role in the 
formation of delusions.   
 
2. Adverse social environments and psychosis  
Empirical findings suggest that adverse environments are interlinked with high symptom 
load. Aversive social environment, such as living with families where high level of expressed 
emotion is the dominant communicational style is a well established predictor of relapse in 
schizophrenia (Bebbington and Kuipers, 1994). A recent study reported that supportive social 
environments are associated with reduced positive symptoms and that family support relates 
to reduced number of hospital admissions up to 3 years after first episode psychosis (Norman 
et al., 2005). It is increasingly recognized that trauma and other aversive events precedes the 
onset of psychosis (Read et al., 2005; Hardy et al., 2005).  
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3. Affective states and positive symptoms 
Schizophrenia often occurs concomitantly with other psychiatric disorders and emotional 
states. Patients with schizophrenia are at increased risk of developing depression relative to 
the already high lifetime prevalence of depression in the general population. In a review by 
Siris and Bench it was found that schizophrenia patients were prone to elevated rates of 
depression, with a modal frequency of about 25% (Siris and Bench, 2003). The prevalence of 
anxiety disorders is also increased in schizophrenia. Approximately 25% of schizophrenia 
patients suffer from panic attacks and 15% meet the criteria of a panic disorder (Buckley et 
al., 2009). Birchwood and colleagues reported that depression nearly always is part of the 
first-episode prodrome that recedes with the positive symptoms (Birchwood, 2003). In a 
longitudinal study of patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorder approximately one-third 
of the patients had clinical levels of depression within a 7.5 years follow-up period (Sands 
and Harrow, 1999). The depressive symptomatology is also accompanied by low levels of 
self-esteem (Freeman et al., 1998). Moreover, 25 % of patients with schizophrenia have a 
diagnosis of obsessive compulsive disorder (Berman et al., 1995) and 40-50 % have a dual 
diagnosis of comorbid substance abuse (Scott et al., 1998; Buckley et al., 2009). This 
comorbidity adversively affects outcome and may also reflect on processes underlying the 
development of schizophrenia (Buckley et al., 2009).   
 The causality, however, between the positive symptoms and the appraisals of self and 
others is uncertain. Though, empirical findings may imply that depression contributes to later 
development of delusions in individuals with preexisting aberrant experiences (Krabbendam 
et al., 2005). Furthermore, patients with psychotic illness tend to manage stressful events 
differently than control subjects, reacting with less positive affect and more negative affect to 
subjective appraisal of stress in daily life (Myin-Germeys et al., 2001).  
 
 
4. Self-appraisal and psychosis 
Early adverse experiences are postulated by Garety et al. (Garety et al., 2001) to create an 
enduring cognitive vulnerability characterized by negative schematic models of the self and 
others (Smith et al., 2006). Individuals with schizophrenia have a negative self-image in the 
sense of poor self-esteem (Kinderman and Bentall, 1996). In addition, the content of their 
psychotic symptoms may affect their self-perception. Two studies have shown that negative 
evaluative beliefs about the self were independently and significantly associated with 
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symptoms of psychosis. The results, however, diverged in the sense that one group found an 
independent association with overall positive symptoms (Barrowclough et al., 2003) and the 
other an association solely for persecutory delusions (Smith et al., 2006). A possible 
explanation is that there might be an independent and direct role for negative evaluative self 
beliefs in the development of psychotic symptoms. On the other hand, the cross-sectional 
design of these studies offers an alternative explanation. The negative evaluative beliefs may 
be secondary to the psychotic experience. Furthermore, patients with psychosis exhibit safety 
behavior, which is a common form of acting on persecutory delusions (Freeman and Garety, 
2003; Freeman et al., 2007). These behaviors are likely to prevent the processing of 
disconfirmatory evidence and will therefore contribute to delusion persistence. Moreover, 
Barrowclough et al. (2003) found that occurrence of positive symptoms (i.e. delusions and 
hallucinations) was associated with  negative evaluations of the self and others. In keeping 
with this finding patients with negatively loaded delusions and hallucinations seem to exhibit 
negative self-concepts (Close and Garety, 1998). Psychotic beliefs may be more firmly held 
if they are consistent with firmly held distorted beliefs present in the first place about the self 
(“I am bad”), others (“you are hostile”) and the world (e.g. “the world is a dangerous”) 
(Garety et al., 2001).   
 
 1.5.2  Designation and assessment 
The clinical concept of insight has been widely applied to determine the patients’ awareness 
concerning symptoms and illness, as well as awareness of treatment needs. A number of 
scales have been developed to assess insight of illness, and their usefulness has been 
demonstrated especially in diagnostics and pharmacological treatment. Though, the 
operationalized insight of illness does not essentially address the patient’s capacity to 
evaluate own psychotic experiences. Observations of psychotic patients in clinical settings 
point to limitations in their understanding of their own aberrant beliefs, experiences and 
disruptive cognitions.   
 Beck emphasized that the cognitive problem in patients with psychosis resides not 
only in their consistent distortions of their experience, but also in their difficulty in distancing 
themselves from these distortions and receiving corrective feedback (Beck and Warman, 
2004). Drawing on the empirical factors which seem to contribute to formation and 
maintenance of the psychotic appraisal (reasoning bias, environmental factors, emotional 
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processes and self-evaluation of aberrant experiences) Beck and colleagues devised the Beck 
Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS), a self-report addressing impairments in reasoning and 
evaluation in psychotic patients (Beck et al., 2004). The questionnaire measures patients’ 
reflection on unusual experiences, capacity to correct erroneous beliefs and own certainty 
about mistaken judgments. The BCIS comprises 15 statements and forms the two subscales, 
self-reflectiveness and self-certainty (For details see appendix fig. 1). 
 
 
1.6   Previous research and knowledge required 
Clinical insight is mostly assessed in reference to the definition by Anthony David 
encompassing awareness of illness, attribution of symptoms to illness and need for treatment. 
Studies comparing levels of insight in bipolar disorders and schizophrenia have found no 
substantial difference between the two, neither during psychotic episodes (Amador et al., 
1994; Pini et al., 2001) nor in remission (Yen et al., 2002). However, few measures of insight 
have been validated for patients with mood disorders. The self-report Birchwood Insight 
Scale (IS) forming three subscales compatible with David’s delineation of insight of illness 
(illness, symptoms, treatment) has only been validated for a mixed sample of patients with 
psychosis. Findings in the original article by Birchwood and associates (1994) suggested that 
one common factor could be extracted from the eight items of the questionnaire. High 
internal consistency (Chronbach’s alpha: 0.75) for the items of the scale and a moderate to 
high correlation between the subscales and the total score (corrected-item-total-correlation: 
0.37 - 0.56) further underscored that one common factor should be used. Although, the 
psychometric properties of the IS have not previously been examined for different diagnostic 
groups with psychotic disorders. Feasibility of the subscales, as well as total score, and utility 
of the scale for schizophrenia, bipolar I and bipolar II disorder was addressed in study I of the 
thesis.   
The introduction of the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) provided an opportunity 
to explore cognitive insight in diagnostic subgroups of patients. Beck and associates explored 
the psychometric properties of the BCIS and found acceptable internal consistency (Alpha 
self-reflectiveness: 0.68; Alpha self-certainty: 0.60) for patients with schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder and major depression (Beck et al., 2004). The authors found that 
self-certainty differentiated between major depressive patients with and without psychosis. 
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Pedrelli and colleagues investigated the psychometric properties in a sample of middle-aged 
and older patients with schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder (Pedrelli et al., 2004). 
Acceptable internal consistency was found for self-reflectiveness (Alpha: 0.70), but not for 
self-certainty (Alpha: 0.50), and the findings were thereby somewhat inconclusive. Warman 
et al. investigated cognitive insight in 37 long-term outpatients with schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder, in addition to 60 healthy controls (Warman et al., 2007). They found 
that the control subjects had better cognitive insight than psychotic patients regardless of 
psychotic status. Individuals with active delusions showed higher self-certainty relative to 
both healthy controls and individuals with psychotic disorders without delusions. 
Surprisingly, individuals with psychotic disorder without active delusions had impaired self-
reflectiveness relative to both healthy controls and individuals with active delusions. 
However, the difference was due to a very low mean score in the group with psychosis, but 
no delusions. This group was small (13 patients), fairly old (mean age 50 years), came from a 
Veteran Administration setting, and had a skewed distribution of gender (11 of the 12 who 
reported gender were men) and ethnicity (5 Caucasian, 7 African, and 1 other). Thus, 
subscale scores and the psychometric properties of the BCIS should be assessed in a larger 
and more representative sample of patients with schizophrenia. As for the IS further research 
is needed on the applicability of the questionnaire for different subgroups of individuals. This 
could include studies on the utility of the scale in groups of patients with and without 
psychosis and among patients along a psychosis continuum. Study II in the dissertation is 
concerned with the utility of the BCIS for patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, as 
well as the applicability for healthy controls.  
The BCIS is primarily devised for individuals with psychosis with anomalous 
thinking and experiences. Thus, the relationship to delusions and hallucinations are of 
particular interest and should draw the attention of the researcher. Bora et al. investigated the 
relationship between cognitive insight and psychotic symptoms in a sample of patients with 
schizophrenia (Bora et al., 2007). Patients with current psychotic symptoms (defined as a 
score of four or higher on the PANSS delusions or PANSS hallucinations items) obtained a 
significantly lower self-reflectiveness score and a higher self-certainty score than patients 
without these symptoms. Concordantly, the authors found a significant negative correlation 
between positive symptoms and self-reflectiveness, as well as a significant positive 
correlation between positive symptoms and self-certainty. In regards to methodology, 
positive symptoms in this study were measured by the PANSS positive subscale. However, 
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studies investigating the factorial structure of the scale  have found that the 7 items forming 
this subscale could represent more than one factor or dimension (White et al., 1997; 
Lindenmayer et al., 2004). Furthermore, the relationships between cognitive insight, 
delusions and hallucinations were not addressed in the study. In the Warman-study the 
relationship between cognitive insight and delusions was investigated in a small sample of 
patients with schizophrenia (Warman et al., 2007). Thus, there is a need to investigate the 
relationship between cognitive insight and psychotic symptoms. In study III of the thesis we 
approached the subject matter by investigating how different constellations of delusions 
and/or hallucinations relate to cognitive insight in a sample of patients with schizophrenia.   
Cognitive insight and neurocognition appear to have a conceptual overlap. In order to 
gain more knowledge about the nature of cognitive insight it seems important to explore the 
relationship to intellectual functioning, both general intellectual abilities and neurocognitive 
domains. To our knowledge there are only two reports on the relationship between 
neurocognition and cognitive insight. In the first study, a significant relationship between 
self-certainty and verbal learning and memory was found in 51 patients with first episode 
psychosis (Lepage et al., 2008). After a modest enlargement of the patient sample the 
strength of this relationship was somewhat attenuated, whereas the relationship between self-
reflectiveness and verbal learning and memory was strengthened (Buchy et al., 2009b). 
However, this study did not control for important confounders. In addition to delusions 
depression is a potential confounder in the relationship between cognitive insight and 
neurocognition. In a study investigating cognitive insight and depression a significant 
positive relationship between self-reflectiveness and depression was found (Beck et al., 
2004),  but others did not report similar relationships (Pedrelli et al., 2004; Warman et al., 
2007). Thus, there is a need for study of the relationship between cognitive insight and 
neurocognition taking potential confounders into account – an approach pursued in the fourth 
study of the dissertation. 
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1. 7  Aims of the study  
 
Main aims of this thesis:   
The overall aim was to investigate methodological, neurocognitive and psychopathological 
aspects of cognitive insight in schizophrenia. Emphasis was also put on methodology in 
clinical insight, the relation between clinical and cognitive insight and comparison to bipolar 
disorder.  
 
The thesis had the following subaims:  
Paper I:  
1. To investigate the psychometric properties of the Birchwood Insight Scale (IS) in patient 
with schizophrenia, bipolar I and bipolar II disorder. 
2. To study the level of clinical insight in patients with these disorders 
 
Paper II:  
1. To examine the subscale scores, internal consistency, as well as intercorrelation for the 
subscales of the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) in schizophrenia, bipolar disorder 
and normal controls.  
2. To explore the relationship between the BCIS and both affective symptom scores and 
clinical insight for the two diagnostic groups. 
3. To compare mean scores for patients and controls. 
 
Paper III:  
1. To investigate the relationship between delusions and hallucinations, occurring solitarily 
or concurrently, and cognitive insight in patients with schizophrenia. 
 
Paper IV:  
1. To investigate the association between cognitive insight and neurocognitive function in 
schizophrenia. 
2.  To explore if neurocognition adds to explained variance in cognitive insight after 
contributions by potential confounders have been accounted for. 
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 2  Material and methods                              
 2.1  Ethical aspects 
The study was approved by the Regional Committee for Medical Research Ethics and the 
Norwegian Data Inspectorate. Participants received oral and written information about the 
study. Specific information was given about the interviews, testing, physical examination and 
other investigations in the TOP study not included in this thesis, such as blood sampling. The 
invitees were informed about procedures for use, storage and erasure of data.  
All participants gave written informed consent. Though, the consent to participate 
could at any given time be retracted without negative consequence for further counseling and 
treatment in mental health care. The collected data could be made available to the participant, 
and, also, data would be erased upon the subject’s request. Data was used and stored without 
the subject’s name, social security number or other means of identification. Only authorized 
health care personal associated with the study had access to the list of participants.  
 
 
2.2  Study design and recruitment of patients  
The present study is part of the TOP study (Thematic Organized Psychoses Research) - a 
translational study on schizophrenia and bipolar disorders, which is a joint collaboration 
between University of Oslo and the university hospitals in Oslo. The health care system in 
Norway is catchment area based and publicly funded, and patients are referred from primary 
care. The inclusion area of the study covers essentially the total population of the city of 
Oslo, approximately 550 000 inhabitants. The present study is a naturalistic, cross-sectional 
study.   
 The patients were recruited from out-patient and in-patient psychiatric units at 
psychiatric hospitals in Oslo, Norway, from October 2002 through July 2007. Patients were 
included mainly from outpatient clinics, but also from intermediate and long term treatment 
units. Inclusion of patients admitted to acute treatment units was awaited until they were 
stabilized and able to consent and participate in interviews and assessments. Eligible for the 
study were patients who met the following inclusion criteria: Age between 18 and 65, 
understand and speak a Scandinavian language, IQ score of above 70, no history of severe 
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head trauma, fulfill the DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia spectrum disorder (schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder and schizophreniform disorder) or bipolar disorders (bipolar I 
disorder, bipolar II disorder and bipolar disorder not otherwise specified), and willing and 
able to give informed consent. The patients were invited to participate in the study by the 
clinician responsible for treatment. Thorough information about the study in general, entailed 
procedures and clinical assessments was given by the research fellows who were all trained 
clinicians (MDs or psychologists).  
 
 
2.3  Subjects 
2.3.1  Samples 
The patients were continuously recruited to the studies in this thesis through the general TOP 
recruitment  protocol. The different insight measures were implemented in different time 
periods without any additional selection criteria. Study I used the Birchwood Insight Scale, 
and patients were recruited until november 2005. The BCIS was introduced in March 2005 
and was used in the samples of study II-IV.  
Due to different research questions, different diagnostic groups were used in 
different studies (table 1). Study I and II have a sample consisting of patients with 
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder and schizophreniform disorder (categorized as 
schizophrenia in this thesis), as well as samples with bipolar disorders. The same sample of 
patients with schizophrenia was used in study II and III, while study I and IV built on a 
sample of schizophrenia included at a different time period. As shown in table 1 the samples 
of patients with bipolar I and II disorders were used in study I, whereas another sample of 
patients with bipolar disorders recruited at a later time period was used in study II 
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Table 1. Substudies of the thesis 
Study     Inclusion period    Schizophrenia       Bipolar          
     Disorder 
    Controls 
   
   Study I 
   
      May 2003 -  
      Nov. 2005 
 
         
      n=101 
 
        n=94 
 
 
Study II 
   
       
      March 2005 -    
      July 200 
 
      
      n=143 
 
        n=92 
 
       n=64 
 
Study III 
  
 
Study IV 
 
      March 2005 -  
      July 2007 
 
 
      n= 102 
  
 
As shown in table 2 the three samples consisting of patients with schizophrenia were 
largely similar regarding demographic and clinical characteristics. The mean illness duration, 
defined as the time since the first contact with a specialized health care unit due to psychosis, 
was under four years (3.6 – 3.9). Mean symptom scores on the Global Assessment of 
Functioning Scale (GAF, for further details see 2.4.2, p. 34-35) reflected a severity of 
symptoms bordering what is observed in psychosis.   
 The three samples of patients with bipolar disorders in paper I and II (table 2) were 
essentially similar in respect to demography and benchmarks clinical characteristics. The 
mean GAF was somewhat lower in study I than in study II. Mean GAF scores as well as 
mean PANSS positive and negative subscale scores yield low to moderate symptom levels.  
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     Table 2.  Demographic and clinical characteristics of the subsamples 
Sch., schizophrenia; BD, bipolar disorder; BD I, bipolar I disorder; BD II, bipolar II disorder; Contr., control subjects. 
Male, percentage in parenthesis, other variables mean with standard deviation presented in parenthesis. GAF, Global 
Assessment of Functioning; GAFs,  Global Assessment of Functioning, symptom; GAFf,  Global Assessment of 
Functioning, function; PANSS, Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale, positive and negative subscale scores.  
 
 
                      Paper I 
The patient sample was included in the period from May 2003 through November 2005. One-
hundred-and-one patients diagnosed with schizophrenia (schizophrenia, n=76; 
schizophreniform disorder, n = 4; schizoaffective disorder, n = 21), 57 patients with bipolar I 
disorder and 37 with bipolar II disorders participated in the study.  
 
Papers II and III 
Paper II and III are based on samples of patients included between March 2005 and July 
2007. A patient sample consisting of 143 patients with schizophrenia (schizophrenia, n=107; 
schizophreniform disorder, n = 10; schizoaffective disorder, n = 26) was used in both studies, 
whereas a sample of 92 patients with bipolar disorders (bipolar I disorder, n = 45; bipolar II 
disorder, n = 43; bipolar disorder not otherwise specified, n = 4) in addition to a control group 
of 64 healthy subjects took part in study II. Twenty-seven of the individuals who participated 
in the control group were randomly selected from statistical records from the same catchment 
area as the patients. The remaining 37 persons were a mixed group of volunteering 
               Study I 
 
                 Study II Study III   Study IV 
 Samples   Sch. 
 n=101 
  BD I  
  n= 57 
  BD II  
 n= 37 
   Sch.      
   n=143 
    BD  
  n=92 
Contr. 
  n=64 
   Sch. 
   n=143 
   Sch. 
    n=102 
 Male (%)  61 (60) 
    
  24 (42)   13 (35)   83 (58)   40 (44) 
    
  25 (39) 
      
    83 (58) 
            
   60 (59) 
 Age (y)  33 (10)   40 (12)   37 (10)    33 (10)   37 (11)   33 (12)    33 (10)    33 (10) 
 GAF 
 
 
sympt   
42 (11)    
   
 56 (11)  
  
 55 (8) 
  43 (11)   61 (12)     43 (11)      40 (11) 
funct    44 (11)   63 (14)     44 (11)    41 (10) 
 PANSS pos  15 (6)     9 (2)  10 (2)   15 (6)   10 (4)      15 (6)     15 (6) 
 PANSS neg  16 (8)   10 (4)  11 (3)   14 (6)    9 (3)      14 (6)     15 (6) 
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professionals. These two control samples attained similar scores and internal consistency on 
the BCIS, and hence, in this thesis the control group is referred to as one group.  
 
 Paper IV 
The sample in paper IV consisted of 102 patients with schizophrenia (schizophrenia, n=81; 
schizophreniform disorder, n=8; schizoaffective disorder, n=13). They were recruited from 
March 2005 through July 2007. Since the paper addressed the relationship between cognitive 
insight and neurocognition patients without both BCIS assessments and neuropsychological 
test scores were excluded. 
 
 2.3.2   Study samples compared to reference group 
In order to evaluate the representativity of the schizophrenia samples in study I-IV 
participants were compared with patients clinically diagnosed with psychotic disorders and 
severe affective disorders registered in a health care survey at Ulleval University Hospital, 
Department of Psychiatry. Nine-hundred-and-sixty-six patients were registered from May 
2003 through April 2005 and compared to study participants with schizophrenia on central 
demographic and clinical variables (see table 3).   
 
 
 
Table 3. Central characteristics of subjects in health care survey (n=966) and patients with 
schizophrenia in study I-IV (n=101/143) 
        Health care survey            Schizophrenia 
           (Study I-IV) 
    Male                   52 %                  58-60 % 
    Age (y)                  39 (13)                 33 (10) 
    GAFs                  40 (13)                  40-43  
                (11-12) 
    GAFf                  40 (13)                  41- 44 
                (10-11) 
Male, percentage. Other variables mean with standard deviation in parenthesis. GAFs, Global Assessment of  
Functioning symptom; GAFf,  Global Assessment of Functioning, functioning.  
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2.4  Measurement 
2.4.1  Diagnosis 
Diagnosis was established using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR-axis I 
disorders (SCID-I, Spitzer et al., 1992). All interviewers finished a training course in SCID 
assessment based on the training program at University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) 
(Ventura et al., 1998) and participated in diagnostic evaluation meetings on regular basis led 
by a clinically experienced professor in psychiatry. Mean overall kappa for SCID diagnoses 
assessed by the UCLA was 0.77 (95 % CI: 0.60–0.94).  
 
2.4.2   General assessments 
History of mental illness, present symptoms, life style and pharmacological treatment were 
obtained from interview with the patient. Additional information was collected from 
treatment records and clinical staff. Severity of symptoms was assessed by the Positive and 
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS, Kay et al., 1987) and the Young Mania Rating Scale - 
Clinician rated (YMRS-C, Young et al., 1978). In the TOP study depression was assessed 
partly with the Inventory of Depressive Symptoms - Clinician rated (IDS-C, Rush et al., 
1996), partly with CDSS (Calgary Depression Scale for Schizophrenia, Addington et al., 
1990), but only the former scores were used in the current work, resulting in a discrepancy 
between the number of patients with IDS-C scores and the number of patients with other 
symptom scores (PANSS, YMRS-C). The PANSS was utilized to assess severity of positive 
symptoms. A score of four or higher was defined as having delusions or hallucinations. 
Concerning assessment of delusions the PANSS P1 definition was followed as described by 
the rating manual: “Beliefs which are unfounded, unrealistic, and idiosyncratic”. 
Hallucinations were measured in accordance with the PANSS P3 rating criteria: “Verbal 
report or behavior indicating perceptions which are not generated by external stimuli. These 
may occur in the auditory, visual, olfactory, or somatic realms”. The severity of symptoms is 
not assessed by involvement of specific sensory modalities, but is rated according to the 
number of (one or more than one) hallucination modalities and their impact on behavior. All 
interviewers participated in inter rater reliability testing which entailed rating of patient 
videos. An intraclass correlation (ICC 1.1, Shrout and Fleiss, 1979) of 0.73 was obtained for 
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the PANSS positive subscale. Psychosocial functioning was measured by the Global 
Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF, Pedersen et al., 2007), and the scores were split into 
scales of symptoms (GAFs) and function (GAFf) to improve psychometric properties. The 
inter-rater reliability of the investigators was good for GAFs and GAFf with an intra class 
correlation (ICC 1.1, Shrout and Fleiss, 1979) of 0.86 and 0.85 respectively.  
 
2.4.3   Assessment of clinical insight  
The Birchwood Insight Scale (IS, Birchwood et al., 1994 ) was used in the assessment of 
clinical insight (for details on the scale see appendix fig. 1). This self-report inventory 
consists of 8 statements originally representing 3 subscales (awareness of illness, relabeling 
of symptoms and need for treatment). Due to low internal consistency for the subscales 
(study I) the usage of the scale in this thesis is restricted to the total score (see discussion, 
4.2.1,  p. 46). The total score has a range of 0 to 12, with a score of 9 or more indicating good 
insight. The original 3-point Likert scale (agree - unsure - disagree) was transformed to a 5-
point scale (agree very much - agree - unsure - disagree - disagree very much). The 
statements of the 8 items were translated from English into Norwegian (Halldora Jonsdottir) 
and the procedure was reversed under blinded conditions back into English. The author of the 
scale had no objections to the translation and the modifications of the scale. 
 
2.4.4  Assessment of cognitive insight 
The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS, Beck et al., 2004)  is a self-report consisting of 15 
statements rated on a 4-point Likert scale (0 = do not agree at all to 3 = agree completely, for 
details regarding the scale see appendix fig.2). Based on factor analyses Beck and coworkers 
divided the 15 items into 2 subscales. The first component consisted of 9 items measuring 
objectivity, reflectiveness and openness to feedback and was labeled self-reflectiveness. 
Under the umbrella of decision-making and resistance to feedback, 6 items were united in a 
second component of the scale, given the label self-certainty. Overall cognitive insight was 
defined by Beck and associates as the difference between self-reflectiveness and self-
certainty and labeled composite index.  High scores on self-reflectiveness (and composite 
index) and low scores on self-certainty are considered as normal. The questionnaire was 
administered without a time limit. With approval from the authors the inventory was 
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translated from English into Norwegian (John A. Engh) and the procedure was reversed 
under blinded conditions back into English. The authors of the scale had no objections to the 
translation.  Scores on self-reflectiveness and self-certainty were applied in paper II-IV, 
whereas the composite index was used in paper II and III. For validation purposes the BCIS 
was applied to control subjects in addition to patients with schizophrenia in paper II. As the 
questionnaire initially was devised for individuals with psychotic symptoms the subscale self-
reflectiveness was split into two components when applied to healthy controls, component I, 
consisting of pathological experiences and, component II, comprising the remaining items. 
 
2.4.5  Neurocognitive assessments 
Neurocognitive assessment was carried out by psychologists with training in standardized 
neuropsychological testing. A battery of neuropsychological tests was administered. In paper 
IV test results were used from five cognitive domains found to be sensitive to dysfunction in 
schizophrenia. In addition, current general intellectual abilities were assessed. The domains 
were verbal learning, processing speed, attention, verbal fluency and inhibition. Full scale IQ 
was also assessed.  
Verbal learning was assessed with Logical Memory from the Wechsler Memory Scale 
(WMS-III). This test requires recollection of two short stories (Wechsler, 2007b). A total 
score for the number of items immediately recalled from both stories was used to measure 
verbal learning. 
Processing speed was assessed with Digit Symbol Test from WAIS-III (Wechsler, 2003). 
The test is comprised by numbers paired with symbols, and the task is to fill in blank spaces 
with correct symbols within the time limit of 90 seconds.  
Attention was assessed with Digit Span from Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III). 
Both the forward and the backward version were presented for the patients. The former test 
requires the participant to repeat a number of digits in the same order as presented, and the 
latter version entails repetition of a number of digits in the backward order of presentation. 
The total score (summation of digits repeated forwards and backwards) was used.  
Verbal fluency was operationalized with Verbal Fluency Letter Test from the Delis Kaplan 
Executive Functioning Scale (D-KEFS; Delis, 2005). The subtest consists of three trials, 
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requiring production of words beginning with the letters ‘F’, ‘A’, and ‘S’. The number of 
words generated in each of the trials was used as measures of verbal fluency.  
Inhibition was assessed with the Color-Word Interference Test from D-KEFS. The test 
consists of four trials. In the first two trials the subject is required to name the colored ink 
patches and to read the printed color names displayed on separate cards as rapidly as possible. 
In the two subsequent trials the cards presented consist of written names of colors printed in 
colored ink that is incongruent with the color name itself. The time taken to name the color of 
the ink was included as the measure of inhibition (third trial D-KEFS).  
Full scale IQ: Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) was used to assess full 
scale IQ (Wechsler, 2007a). The following subtests were used: Vocabulary, Similarities, 
Block Design, and Matrix Reasoning.  
Scaled scores from published norms with defined mean scores and defined standard 
deviations (SD) were used for all neurocognitive test performance (subtests neurocognitive 
domains: mean=10, SD=3; WASI: mean=100, SD=15).  
 
 
2.5  Statistical analysis 
Statistical analyses were carried out using the software Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) version 13.0, 14.0 and 16.0 for Windows.  
 
Paper I  
Reliability analyses of the Birchwood Insight Scale (IS) were performed by calculating the 
internal consistency (method of Cronbach’s alpha) for the 3 subscales and the total score in 
patients with schizophrenia, bipolar I and bipolar II disorder. Bivariate correlations between 
the subscales were calculated using Pearson correlation tests.  
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Paper II  
Student t-tests for independent samples were used for examining statistical differences 
between the schizophrenia and the bipolar group on clinical variables (GAF, PANSS, IDS-
C). A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) and post-hoc tests were employed when 
comparing the three groups (schizophrenia group, bipolar group and healthy controls) on age, 
gender distribution and BCIS subscale scores. The internal consistency for the two subscales 
was calculated as Cronbach's alpha, as well as the average correlation between each item and 
the remaining items within the subscale (corrected-item-total-correlation, CITC). 
Additionally, the subscale intercorrelation was estimated for each of the three groups. The 
correlation between the BCIS subscales and the PANSS insight item (G12) was calculated 
using Pearson correlation test.  
 
Paper III  
A grouping variable based on the presence of four combinations of delusions and/or 
hallucinations (no delusions and no hallucinations (-D/-H), delusions and no hallucinations 
(+D/-H), delusions and hallucinations (+D/+H), and no delusions and hallucinations (-D/+H)) 
was computed. To test the main effect of this grouping variable on cognitive insight a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was employed with self-reflectivenes and self-
certainty representing the multivariate outcome. As covariates, we used the grouping variable 
as well as the potential confounders gender, age, illness duration, and antipsychotic 
medication.  Non significant covariates were removed. Cognitive insight was also analyzed 
univariately by analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the composite index as outcome. Similar 
tests as in the MANOVA were performed. Non linearity and interactions were assessed. Two 
null hypotheses were tested:  Each group was no different from the average of the remaining 
3 groups, and the 2 groups with delusions were no different from the 2 groups without 
delusions (similar for hallucinations). These hypotheses were tested using linear contrasts 
with Bonferroni correction for multiple testing. 
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Paper IV 
Pearson correlation tests were used for investigating the relationship between BCIS subscales 
scores and neurocognitive test performance. A linear regression model was employed with 
the BCIS subscales self-reflectiveness and self-certainty representing the outcome - cognitive 
insight. To search for unique contributions in explained variance in self-reflectiveness and 
self-certainty potential confounders were statistically controlled. Selection of variables in the 
regression model was based on Pearson correlation tests between scores on the BCIS 
subscales and variables with assumed clinical importance. The independent variables in the 
regression model did not intercorrelate significantly, except for the relationships attention - 
full scale IQ (r=0.52, p<0.001) and insight of illness - depression (r=0.31, p=0.002). The 
independent variables were entered one at a time in the sequential regression analysis except 
for full scale IQ and verbal learning. To calculate the unique contribution by neurocognitive 
measures these independent variables were entered together in a final block (stepwise 
analysis). The model was examined for non-linear relationships between the independent and 
the dependant variables.  
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3  Results   
 
PAPER I  
The Birchwood Insight Scale (IS) forms three subscales compatible with the frequently used 
factors of insight of illness (i.e. awareness of illness, attribution of symptoms to illness and 
need for treatment). In this study the psychometric properties of the scale and levels of insight 
were examined in samples of patients with schizophrenia and bipolar I and bipolar II 
disorder. Except for “need for treatment” the IS subscales showed poor to marginal internal 
consistency, indicating that the usage of the instrument should be restricted to the total score. 
Nonetheless, we found that the IS total score works well for patients with schizophrenia and 
also for patients with the diagnosis of bipolar I disorder. However, for patients with bipolar II 
disorder the scale seems to work poorly. For validation purposes the relationship between the 
IS total score and the PANSS insight item was investigated. A moderate to high correlation 
was found for patients with schizophrenia (r=-0.54, p<0.01) as well as for patients with 
bipolar disorders (r=-0.49, p<0.01), indicating acceptable to good validity for both diagnostic 
groups. For patients with bipolar II disorder, however, a low to moderate correlation was 
found (r=-0.27), indicating poor validity of the scale for this diagnostic group. The cut off 
score on the Birchwood Insight Scale (total) was set to 9 by the authors. In this study the 
mean IS total scores were similar in the groups with schizophrenia and bipolar I disorder, 8.2 
and 8.5 respectively, reflecting a general attenuated clinical insight in the groups. Sixty-two 
% of the patients with schizophrenia and 56 % of the patients with bipolar I disorder had 
attenuated insight when applying the cut off defined by Birchwood and colleagues.   
 
       
PAPER II 
The internal consistency for the two subscales of the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS), 
self-reflectiveness and self-certainty, was acceptable for the clinical groups of patients with 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and also for healthy controls . The internal consistency 
was somewhat higher for self-reflectiveness than for self-certainty. However, the subscale of 
self-reflectiveness had items which were conceived differently among control subjects than 
among the patients. These items (3, 5, 6 and 15) contained statements which could be 
 41 
 
interpreted as referring to psychotic experiences, and, therefore, were difficult to answer by 
control subjects. Thus, self-reflectiveness was split into component I, referring to 
pathological experiences, and component II comprising the remaining items. The mean score 
for component I was significantly lower for the controls than for both the schizophrenia and 
the bipolar group. The mean score for component II, however, was similar for the three 
groups. The scores of the control subjects cannot be compared to patient scores without 
excluding these items referring to psychotic experiences. Furthermore, the two subscales self-
reflectiveness and self-certainty showed low or moderate intercorrelation for the patient 
groups (schizophrenia: r=-0.13; bipolar disorders: r=-0.21, p<0.05). 
              
 
 
 
PAPER III  
The relationships between delusions and hallucinations, occurring solitarily or concurrently, 
and cognitive insight as measured by the BCIS were investigated in patients with 
schizophrenia. A grouping variable was computed based on four combinations of the 
presence of delusions and/or hallucinations. A multivariate model (MANOVA) with both 
self-reflectiveness and self-certainty as outcomes was employed. The potential confounders 
gender, age, illness duration and antipsychotic medication were non-significant. The 
grouping variable was the only significant covariate (p = 0.0297). Additionally, the group of 
patients with no delusions but with hallucinations (-D/+H) was the only group which was 
significantly different from the rest (p = 0.0076). A univariate model (ANOVA) with 
composite index as outcome was also utilized. The same independent variables were entered 
in the model, and in the same way as in the multivariate model the grouping variable was the 
only significant covariate (p =0.0034). Two groups (-D/+H) and (+D/-H) were significantly 
different from the rest in the univariate model (p = 0.0018 and p= 0.0124 respectively). Both 
the multivariate and the univariate model showed that the two groups with delusions were 
significantly different from the groups without delusions (MANOVA: (-D/-H and -D/+H) vs 
(+D/-H and +D/+H): p =0.0011; ANOVA: (-D/-H and -D/+H) vs (+D/-H and +D/+H): 
p<0.001). 
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  PAPER IV 
The study investigated the relationship between cognitive insight and neurocognition in a 
sample of patients diagnosed with schizophrenia. Pearson correlation tests were used for 
examining the relationship between BCIS subscales scores and neurocognitive test 
performance. A linear regression model was employed to calculate the explained variance in 
self-reflectiveness and self-certainty. Potential confounders were accounted for. In the present 
study we found significant negative correlations between self-certainty and both verbal 
learning and IQ. Though, only verbal learning added uniquely to the explained variance in 
self-certainty after contributions by insight of illness, depression and delusions had been 
taken into account. The contribution in explained variance of self-certainty was essentially 
unaltered before and after controlling for the clinical features.  No association was found 
between self-reflectiveness and neurocognition. 
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4  Discussion 
4.1  General methodology  
4.1.1  Representativity 
In Norway, patients with psychotic disorders are treated in government funded specialized 
out and inpatients units within the catchment area based health care system. Thus, diagnostic 
distribution and treatment is not likely to be strongly biased for socioeconomic factors. The 
current study is part of a multisite study with participants from outpatient clinics, as well as 
intermediate and long-term treatment units. As the subjects were recruited from different 
parts of the treatment chain within specialized psychiatric care and inclusion proceeded over 
an extended period of time, patients exhibited diverse constellations of symptoms and 
symptom severity. Interviews were not carried out in destabilized psychotic patients and few 
subjects were recruited from acute treatment units. Inclusion of these patients took place after 
stabilization, presuming that they were able and willing to consent. 
  In studies of patients with psychotic disorders the question often emerges whether 
there is a selection bias in respect to symptomatology, so also in the current work. Few 
patients participated in this study with acute exacerbation and selection of patients with mild 
and moderate severity of symptoms cannot be ruled out. However, the research fellows 
involved in the current study had contact on a weekly basis with the clinicians in the 
psychiatric units giving thorough information to personnel and patients about the study, and, 
therein, seeking to reduce speculations concerning the content and aims of the research 
protocol. In addition, a high degree of researcher availability intended to prevent general 
skepticism towards the study and to facilitate recruitment of patients with a broad range in 
symptoms and functioning.  
All patients gave informed consent before participating in the study. Due to legal 
restrictions set by the Personal Data Filing System Act we were not allowed to register the 
patients declining to participate. In the absence of such a registry the exact proportion of 
invited patients actually participating in the study cannot be assessed. Nonetheless, a part of 
the patients have declined after being invited and informed. A rough estimate of the 
percentage of patients who actively declined could be 10-15 % of all invited patients.  Further 
concerns relevant to the subject of representativity are that a proportion of patients has not 
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been asked to participate due to extensive symptomatology, in particular acute psychotic 
symptoms, or because their capacity to consent was regarded as compromised. It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, however, to address the complex issue of consent to participate in 
research at length. Although, a brief discussion of the relationship between the capacity to 
give informed consent and insight of illness is pertinent. The decision-making capacity, a 
term increasingly central to medical law and ethics, seems to be related to the capacity to 
consent in patients with psychosis (Carpenter, Jr. et al., 2000). Thus, generally, patients with 
impairments in decision-making capacity are less likely to participate in clinical studies. Such 
decision making capacity does not seem to be associated with psychopathology, but rather 
associated to insight of illness (Owen et al., 2009) and neurocognition (Carpenter, Jr. et al., 
2000). These empirical findings seem to correspond with the clinical observations that a part 
of the patients with psychosis withdraw from both recommended diagnostics, treatment and, 
also, participation in clinical research. Patients with excessive symptom severity or 
compromised capacity to consent are mainly encountered in acute treatment units where they 
seem to make up a large proportion of patients with psychotic disorders, perhaps half or even 
more of the hospitalized patients. However, this multisite study with consistent patient 
inclusion over many years permits to recruit patients who were destabilized at one time in 
other stages of the illness. An estimated proportion of patients not being invited due to illness 
severity and consent issues is another 10-15 % of the patients with psychosis. Hence, a 
possible proportion of patients prevented from inclusion due to active decline, high symptom 
severity and compromised capacity to consent could be in the magnitude of 20-30 % of the 
patients with psychotic disorders. The number of participants in the studies of the thesis has 
been further restricted due to organizational reasons. Implementation of the insight measures 
was after the main study had been initiated, but, notably, the selection criteria remained the 
same.  
The representativity of the schizophrenia samples in the current work was further 
investigated by comparing them with a reference group consisting of patients with 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorders receiving treatment in any psychiatric department within 
the Ulleval University Hospital. The level of global symptoms was similar in the samples of 
patients with schizophrenia and the reference group. In addition, a recent study comparing a 
mixed sample of patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder with this reference group 
found no significant differences on key demographic variables (Ringen et al., 2008). In 
conclusions, there is probably no systematic bias in the studies of the thesis, and the findings 
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can be generalized to patients with schizophrenia receiving treatment under ‘real life 
conditions’. 
 
4.1.2   Reliability of general assessments  
Axis I diagnoses (DSM-IV) were established using the Structured Clinical Interview for 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (SCID-I). All interviewers 
participated in diagnostic evaluation meetings on regular basis and also completed a training 
course in SCID assessment. Reliability for the actual diagnostic interviews was assessed 
using a stratified random sample consisting of cases from each of the clinical raters involved. 
Vignettes rated by 2 experts blind to the study ratings demonstrated a high overall agreement 
for the diagnostic categories. Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) Scale was used to 
measure global symptoms and psychosocial functioning. We found high inter rater reliability 
of both GAF and PANSS scores. The latter is of particular importance since the grouping 
variable in study 3 was built on the PANSS scores. 
  
  
4.2  Main results   
4.2.1  Psychometric properties of a clinical insight measure 
Interview based instruments have been widely used in psychosis research, but during the last 
two decades the usage of self-reports has become more frequent. The scales applied in the 
current work, as well as most other self-rating scales, have a simple form, are easy to 
complete and are less time-consuming than rater-based scales. Self-reports may provide a 
better control for confounding variables conceivably inherent in the patient-examiner 
interaction (Young et al., 2003). Young et al. compared the interview based and self-report 
method in the assessment of clinical insight and postulated that the attendance of a rater may 
add many complexities to the process of self-reflection due to exacerbated cognitive 
problems (Young et al., 2003). The authors argue that this could be consistent with previous 
research showing that self-generated problem solving techniques (“scaffolding technique”) 
were robust and stable over time when compared to methods involving more direct 
participation by a researcher (Young and Freyslinger, 1995). In two studies comparing 
researcher rated insight measures and self-reports, significant correlations were found in 
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insight scores only when the self-reports were administered first (Jovanovski et al., 2007; 
Young et al., 2003). The authors offered the explanation that the presence of an active 
examiner aggravates cognitive problems as well as social skill deficits and that data are more 
reliable when the individual makes the initial decision regarding own beliefs without the 
social influence. Notably, these studies used the extensive rater based scale SUMD to assess 
insight. Whether these findings can be generalized to studies using an insight measure being 
part of a scale measuring symptom severity, such as the PANSS, is uncertain.  
 In the studies of this thesis we used the Birchwood Insight Scale (IS) consisting of 8 
statements rated by the patient on a Likert scale. These items form three subscales compatible 
with the frequently used factors of insight of illness (i.e. awareness of illness, attribution of 
symptoms to illness and need for treatment). In the original study by Birchwood and 
associates reliability and validity was explored in a mixed psychiatric sample of 133 patients 
(Birchwood et al., 1994). The authors found that the 8 items of the self-rating scale could be 
accounted for by a common factor, therein obtaining acceptable construct validity. 
Cronbach’s alpha was high to very high for the total scale, indicating good internal 
consistency for the scale on the whole. However, in order to gain knowledge about the utility 
of the IS for patients diagnosed with different psychotic disorders, we investigated its 
psychometric properties when applied to patients with bipolar I and II disorder, as well as 
schizophrenia in study I of this thesis. In bipolar I disorder and schizophrenia poor to modest 
internal consistency was found for the subscales “relabelling of symptoms” and “awareness 
of illness”, whereas the internal consistency was even lower in the bipolar II group. For all 
diagnostic groups Cronbach’s alpha was somewhat higher for the subscale “need for 
treatment” than for the other two subscales. Each of the IS subscales, however, consists of 
only 2-4 statements, and as Cronbach’s alpha is a function of the number of items within the 
confined factor or subscale (Cortina, 1993), a somewhat deflated internal consistency would 
be expected. Moreover, the poor internal consistency of the IS subscales implies poor 
validity. This taken together with findings from the original study by Birchwood, showing 
high internal consistency for the total score, leads to the conclusion that the scale measures 
one dimension, and, subsequently, the usage of the IS should be restricted to the total score. 
Birchwood and colleagues also found an association between an interview based insight 
measure (Present State Exam, PSE, see introduction, 1.4.3, p. 18) and the IS total score. 
Consistent with this finding we found a moderate to high correlation between PANSS insight 
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measure and the total score of the IS for schizophrenia (r = -0.54, p<0.01) and bipolar I 
disorder (r = -0.49, p<0.01), indicating acceptable validity of the IS for both groups.  
 
4.2.2  Psychometric properties of the cognitive insight measure 
 Applicability in schizophrenia and bipolar disorders  
Cognitive insight has recently been delineated and operationalized. In order to gain 
knowledge on the applicability of the cognitive insight measure, Beck Cognitive Insight 
Scale (BCIS), it is essential to investigate the psychometric properties of the scale. Beck and 
associates conducted a principal component analysis of the 15 items of the scale to determine 
if they constituted one or several factors. A two component solution displayed the simplest 
structure with all but one item loading saliently on one component as opposed to the other 
component. However, the principal component analysis does not provide enough evidence to 
conclude that these items are distributed in two factors (Cortina, 1993). To estimate the 
unidimensionality of the items we built on these potential factors and calculated their internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha), as well as the intercorrelation between the potential factors. 
Thus, the intercorrelation was used as a confirmatory analysis of dimensionality and the 
internal consistency indicated the strength of the factors for patients with schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorders. We found that self-reflectiveness and self-certainty were weakly or 
moderately intercorrelated in the two groups suggesting that they represent different 
dimensions (schizophrenia: r=-0.13; bipolar disorders: r= -0.21, p>0.05). Alpha was 
essentially the same for the groups (schizophrenia: self-reflectiveness alpha = 0.72, self-
certainty alpha = 0.63; bipolar disorder:  self-reflectiveness alpha = 0.73 , self-certainty 
alpha= 0.61; controls: self-reflectiveness alpha =0.73, self-certainty alpha= 0.63). In general, 
the level of acceptable internal consistency is dependent on the decision being made with the 
scale. The finer the distinction that needs to be made, the better the reliability must be. In 
addition, a test used for individual judgment should be more reliable than one used for group 
decisions or research purposes (Streiner, 2003). There are two possible justifications for the 
distinction between usage for groups and individuals. First, the research will draw 
conclusions from a mean score averaged across many individuals, and the sample size will 
serve to reduce the error of measurement in comparison to group differences. Second, rarely 
will decisions related to research findings be made on the basis of a single study. Instead 
inferences are usually made on a series of replicated studies (Streiner, 2003). Although, there 
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are no rigid rules regarding the level of acceptable reliability, statisticians have given certain 
recommendations varying between 0.60 and 0.70. Nunally recommended a minimum 
reliability of 0.70 when the scale is used in research, and 0.90 when the scale is used 
clinically (Nunnally, 1978). Similarly, Weiner and Steward considered reliability coefficients 
in the range of 0.60 - 0.70 as acceptable for tests used in research where no decisions will be 
made that directly affect individuals (Weiner and Stewart, 1984). 
The relationship between measures of cognitive and clinical insight has been studied in 
previous studies, as well as in study II of the thesis. A moderate correlation was found 
between the two, indicating that the BCIS represent a dimension different from insight of 
illness. However, to what degree the scale measures overconfidence in own beliefs and a 
person’s capacity to evaluate own beliefs, is uncertain.  
As the BCIS has rather recently been devised, there is, to our knowledge, no other 
instrument used in the assessment of cognitive insight to which it can be compared. This 
limits the possibilities for estimation of its validity. In study III we hypothesized that intact 
cognitive insight might reflect awareness of the voices’ origin in patients with schizophrenia. 
However, on average patients with schizophrenia have relatively poor cognitive skills which 
in turn are likely to affect cognitive insight. Thus, whether cognitive insight (or the possible 
awareness of voices origin) should be considered a behavioral outcome of cognitive deficits 
in schizophrenia is undecided. Whether such an epiphenomenon is present could be examined 
by comparing delusional and non-delusional patients with schizophrenia or investigating 
attributional bias in patients with other diagnosis than schizophrenia (e.g. delusional disorder) 
(Menon et al., 2006).  
In conclusions, building on the principal component analysis conducted in the original 
work by Beck and colleagues, suggesting the existence of two factors within the BCIS, the 
estimated internal consistency further indicates unidimentionality within each of the two 
subscales.   
 
 
 Applicability for non-psychotic subjects 
The similar scores on self-reflectiveness and self-certainty attained by the control subjects 
and the clinical groups were unexpected. However, among healthy controls the omission  of 
items was higher for the self-reflectiveness subscale (14 %) than for self-certainty (3 %), 
indicating that the former subscale contained items which were conceived differently among 
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the control subjects than among the patients, which is understandable due to lack of psychotic 
experiences in this group. A closer investigation of scoring profiles disclosed a significantly 
lower score for controls than for the patient groups on a component of the self-reflectiveness 
subscale consisting of 4 items referring to psychotic experiences. This implies that 
comparison of scores between control subjects and patients should be carried out only for 
items of the scale without referral to psychosis. Although, presuming that the BCIS-ratings of 
the controls are compared with patients without psychotic symptoms, all items in subscale 
self-reflectiveness might be applicable for means of investigating relations between cognitive 
insight and other domains such as psychopathology. The two components within self-
reflectiveness were fairly strongly correlated for all groups, and consequently, there was no 
clear indication that they constitute two separate dimensions.  
 
4.2.3  Cognitive insight –  different, yet complementary to clinical insight          
Clinicians frequently observe that patients with schizophrenia are able to detect the erroneous 
nature of beliefs held by others, but not when occurring within themselves. The ability to 
distance themselves from these distorted beliefs also seems to be impaired in these patients. 
Such self-evaluation and reflection upon own beliefs are not necessarily addressed by the 
concept insight of illness, which primarily focuses on aspects of clinical phenomenology 
essential for diagnosis and treatment. Cognitive insight is rooted in models for psychosis 
developed within the framework of cognitive psychology. These cognitive models have in 
particular been concerned with formation of delusions. Emphasis is put on the interplay 
between aberrant beliefs, (mis)interpretations and current experiences. These models also 
point out the significance of specific erroneous inferences in respect to frequency, degree of 
conviction and relative incorrigibility. 
In keeping with cognitive theory Beck and Warman postulated a close interaction 
between delusions, information-processing and the capacity to view own interpretations 
objectively. In the clinical setting a patient suffering from delusions could accept the 
professionals’ explanation of symptoms and convey agreement, though, this may or may not 
reflect a change in the underlying belief system. Misinterpretations are common also in 
individuals with non-psychotic disorders, such as patients with depression or panic disorder. 
Despite difficulty accessing previous experiences these patients often retain their capacity to 
reflect upon them and to recognize that their interpretations might have been wrong (Beck, 
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1985). In patients with psychosis, however, this capacity is frequently impaired. The 
designators of cognitive insight suggest that the patients’ relative inability to distance 
themselves can be broken down to impairment of objectivity about cognitive distortions,  loss 
of ability to put the distortions into perspective and resistance to corrective feedback from 
others, in addition to overconfidence in own interpretations and conclusions.  
The relationship between insight of illness and cognitive insight has been investigated 
in a study by Pedrelli et al (2004). In a sample of middle aged and older patients with 
schizophrenia a significant positive association was found between self-reflectiveness and 
clinical insight as measured by Birchwood Insight Scale (total score), whereas no association 
was found between self-certainty and clinical insight (Pedrelli et al., 2004). Investigating a 
small subsample of patients Beck and associates found a strong negative association between 
self-reflectiveness and insight into delusions using the SUMD (Beck et al., 2004) (for details 
on SUMD see introduction, 1.4.3, p.18). In study II of the thesis the relationship between 
cognitive and clinical insight was assessed using Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) and 
the rater based PANSS insight item. Self-reflectiveness was associated with high insight of 
illness and self-certainty was associated with poor insight of illness. Thus, the finding in the 
current study regarding self-reflectiveness and insight of illness is congruent with the finding 
in the study by Pedrelli et al., but the finding concerning self-certainty and insight of illness is 
inconsistent with their finding. It is important to note, however, that the levels of self-
reflectiveness and self-certainty scores in the Pedrelli-study differ from the scores in the 
studies of the thesis. In the former study the mean scores were 12.5 (SD=5.8) and 7.2 
(SD=3.1) respectively, where as in study II the scores were 14.5 (SD=4.8) and 8.2 (SD=3.4). 
The question then arises if these discrepancies are related to dissimilarities between the 
samples of the two studies. Sixty-nine % of the patients in the Pedrelli-study were male and 
the mean age was 53 years (SD=8, range: 40-77), where as in the current work 58-60 % of 
the patients with schizophrenia were male, and the mean age was 33 years (SD=10). 
Obviously, there is a large difference in mean age between the samples. The effect of age on 
cognitive insight, however, is uncertain. In study IV of this dissertation we found no 
association between self-reflectiveness and age (r=-0.09) or between self-certainty and age 
(r=0.06). To our knowledge the Warman-study is the only additional study which has 
investigated this relationship. In a small sample of patients with schizophrenia and 
schizoaffective disorder exihibiting current delusions and a mean age of 48.1 (SD=6.0), no 
association was found between self-reflectiveness (M=13.5, SE=0.7, standard deviation not 
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presented) or self-certainty (M=8.6, SD=2.9) on the one hand and age on the other hand. The 
low statistical power in the study, however, increases the risk of running a type II error. In 
both the Pedrelli and in the Warman-study patients had relatively high mean age, in addition 
to low scores on self-reflectiveness and high scores on self-certainty. However, no conclusion 
on the relationship between age and cognitive insight can be drawn.   
 On the whole, the findings of the current study suggest that self-reflectiveness and 
self-certainty represent two distinct dimensions of cognitive insight which are only weakly to 
moderately related to insight of illness. 
 
 
Table 4.   BCIS subscale scores in previous studies and study II of the current work 
Sch., schizophrenia; SA, schizoaffective disorder. ¹Composite index is not applied in study II, but is presented in 
the thesis for means of comparison  
 
4.2.4   Delusions associated with poor cognitive insight 
The close integration of delusions in the hallucinatory process has been shown in several 
studies (Hustig and Hafner, 1990; Liddle, 1987b). Most patients with schizophrenia have 
delusional explanations for their voices which have either developed over time or the 
hallucinations have been incorporated into pre-existing delusional ideas. It has been proposed 
that auditory verbal hallucinations arise from a problem with monitoring one’s own thoughts 
(or inner speech) so that they are misidentified as external ‘‘voices”. Hallucinating patients 
Study   Self-reflectiveness    Self- certainty    Composite index 
Beck 
et al. 
Sch., n = 32         13.0 (5.0)         7.9 (3.8)         5.0 (5.8) 
SA dis., n = 43         13.3 (4.7)         6.5 (3.4)         6.6 (5.8) 
Pedrelli at al., n =164         12.5 (5.8)         7.2 (3.1)         5.2 (5.8) 
Warman et al., n = 49         11.7 (2.9)         6.8 (2.7)         4.9 (4.1) 
Bora et al., n = 138         15.3 (4.4)       10.8 (3.1)         4.5 (6.0) 
Engh et al. (study II),  
n = 143 
        14.5 (4.8)         8.2 (3.4)         6.3 (6.2)¹ 
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with schizophrenia have been found to misattribute the source of self-generated speech to an 
external source to a larger degree than non hallucinating patients with the same diagnosis 
(Baker and Morrison, 1998; Morrison and Haddock, 1997). At the same time empirical 
findings suggest that the externalizing bias in patients with hallucinations is similar to the 
externalizing bias in patients with delusions (Young et al., 1987; Bentall, 1990). A study with 
experimental design showed that schizophrenia patients with delusions, but no hallucinations 
tended to attribute distorted voices in the same manner as patients with both hallucinations 
and delusions (Johns et al., 2001). In another experimental study where schizophrenia 
patients determined the source of self-generated speech (“self” or “others”), it was found that 
patients with delusions, either alone or in the combination with hallucinations, were very 
likely to present with speech misattribution. Patients’ identification of source as “other” was 
positively correlated with severity of delusions. The findings in these experimental studies 
indicate that the propensity to misattribute the source of hallucinations is related to the 
occurrence of delusions.   
 Cognitive insight is assessed with Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) encompassing 
the two subscales self-reflectiveness and self-certainty. Self-reflectiveness entails the 
patients’ capacity and willingness to observe their mental productions and to consider 
alternative explanations, where as self-certainty addresses (over)confidence in own beliefs. 
Overall cognitive insight was assessed by the composite index and defined as the difference 
between the scores of self-reflectiveness and self-certainty. Calculation of the index score 
was based on the hypothesis that patients’ level of overconfidence about their beliefs would 
lessen the capacity to be self-reflective (Pedrelli et al., 2004). Possibly, this could represent a 
valuable tool for studying underlying factors related to delusions. Several studies have shown 
an excessively external attribution for negative events in deluded patients with schizophrenia 
or delusional disorder (Kinderman and Bentall, 1997; Bentall et al., 1991; Kaney and Bentall, 
1989b), and the externalizing bias seems to be related to delusion’s formation. In study III of 
the thesis the hypothesis was put forward that overall cognitive insight could reflect the 
attribution of voices in patients with schizophrenia. High overall cognitive insight could yield 
the internalizing of the auditory hallucinations, whereas low cognitive insight could reflect an 
externalizing bias of voice hearing, each representing extremities on a continuum. Hence, 
cognitive insight might represent a link between delusions and hallucinations in patients with 
schizophrenia. However, on average patients with schizophrenia have poor cognitive skills 
which in turn are likely to affect cognitive insight (or the possible awareness of voices 
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origin). In study IV an association was found between cognitive insight and IQ and verbal 
learning (for furher details see 4.2.6, p.56-57). Thus, whether cognitive insight should be 
considered a behavioral outcome of cognitive deficits in schizophrenia or a separate 
dimension is undecided.  
We studied the relationships between cognitive insight and both delusions and 
hallucinations in subgroups of patients with different constellations of psychotic symptoms. 
Thus, the relationships between delusions and hallucinations, occurring solitarily or 
concurrently, and cognitive insight were investigated. We found that delusions irrespective of 
the presence or absence of hallucinations were associated with low self-reflectiveness and 
high self-certainty, reflecting low cognitive insight. The present results of low self-
reflectiveness and high self-certainty in patients with delusions were expected because 
subjective certainty of judgment and not listening to counterarguments are implicit in the 
concept of delusions, and also in line with several but not all previous reports. Beck et al. 
reported a significant negative correlation between scores on PANSS delusions and self-
reflectiveness, which is consistent with our findings (Beck et al., 2004). The authors also 
found a tendency toward a negative association between overall cognitive insight and both 
delusions and hallucinations. Our findings on the relationship between delusions and self-
certainty are in accordance with the findings of Warman et al. (Warman et al., 2007), but the 
findings regarding delusions and self-reflectiveness are inconsistent. The questionable 
representativity of the patient sample and low sample size in the Warman-study indicates that 
the results should be interpreted with caution, as the authors discussed. Buchy et al. studied 
cognitive insight and delusions in a sample of 13 delusional and 53 non-delusional patients 
with first episode psychosis (Buchy et al., 2009b). In this recent study the authors found that 
participants with delusions exhibited higher self-reflectiveness, but similar self-certainty 
compared to participants without delusions. Buchy and associates suggest that the capacity to 
refrain from overconfidence may interact with delusions differently across the various phases 
of psychosis. The marked self-certainty in first-episode psychosis patients could then reflect 
the minimal feedback acquired regarding the false nature of their beliefs. All things 
considered, the findings in the current work is consistent with previous studies showing an 
association between delusions and overconfidence in own beliefs. Though, further studies are 
required on the topic of cognitive insight and formation of psychotic symptoms. 
Findings from a recent study investigating first-episode-psychosis patients with 
structural MRI suggest an association between high self-certainty and low bilateral 
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hippocampal volumes (Buchy et al., 2009a), though, the relation to other cortical areas were 
not explored in the study. The involvement of the frontal lobes has also been postulated to be 
involved in self-evaluation. However, there is growing interest in the possible role of neural 
systems underlying the appraisal of the self and others. In an fMRI study investigating self-
evaluation in healthy subjects, an activation was found in the dorsal and ventral medial 
prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate gyrus (Johnson et al., 2002). The latter area appears 
to mediate an interaction between memory retrieval and emotion (Maddock, 1999). On the 
whole, further studies are required on self-appraisal, the formation of psychotic symptoms 
and neurobiological correlates. 
 
4.2.5  Solitary hallucinations possibly associated with high cognitive insight 
In study III of the thesis the patient group with no delusions, but current hallucinations  
(-D/+H) was associated with high self-reflectiveness and low self-certainty, reflecting high 
cognitive insight, a finding that has not been reported earlier. It was anticipated that this 
group would have better cognitive insight than the remaining patients, but that these patients 
would be more cognitively insightful than the patients with neither delusions nor 
hallucinations (-D/-H) was surprising. However, this group consisted of only 15 individuals 
and due to the low statistical power a type I error cannot be ruled out.  
 Possibly, solitary hallucinations co-occurring with open-mindedness and high 
cognitive insight cannot be entirely explained by lack of delusional ideation. In general, 
hallucinations create increased ambiguity and incoherence that make delusional 
misinterpretations more likely. The most cognitively insightful and grounded individuals, 
however, might overcome the challenge of incorporating hallucinatory sensations into a 
reality-based interpretation of the world. Hence, (-D/+H) patients on average would be 
expected to be more insightful than (-D/-H) patients who have not had the challenge of 
incorporating hallucinated sensations into a reality-based interpretation of the world. In 
conclusion, the concurrence of hallucinations and no delusions is possibly associated with 
high overall cognitive insight.  
 Clinical characteristics and outcome have been explored in a small sample of patients 
with chronic auditory hallucinations and a sudden onset. Poor response to treatment with 
atypical antipsychotics was found (Mauri et al., 2006; Mauri et al., 2008). The authors 
suggest applying the diagnosis “Hallucinatory Disorder” and point out that further research 
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on this patient group could be conducted with less interfering effect of the other symptoms 
that characterize the clinical picture of schizophrenia. Thus, the investigation would be more 
closely connected to the hallucinatory phenomenon (Mauri et al., 2006). Efforts have also 
been made to characterize neurobiological correlates associated with hallucinations. White 
matter changes have been found in schizophrenia patients hearing voices (Hubl et al., 2004). 
These regions of alterations constitute the most important connections between language – 
related frontal and temporal regions. The aberrant connections may lead to abnormal 
activation in regions that normally process external acoustical and language stimuli (Hubl et 
al., 2004). In an fMRI study investigating schizophrenia patients with auditory hallucinations 
the pattern of neural activity was remarkably similar to what had been previously found in 
healthy volunteers imagining another person talking to them (auditory verbal imagery) 
(Shergill et al., 2000a). A paucity in the activation of a region in the frontal cerebral cortex 
(supplementary motor area, SMA) was found during auditory hallucinations. SMA is 
implicated in the deliberate generation of inner speech (Curtis et al., 1998; Shergill et al., 
2000b). Shergill and coworkers speculated that patients’ lack of awareness that inner speech 
has been generated, considered to be a critical deficit underlying auditory hallucinations, 
might be related to the altered cortical activation. A finding in another neuroimaging study 
indicated that the anterior cingulate cortex play a potential role in the formation of psychotic 
symptoms. Disturbances in the anterior cingulate cortex function seemed  related to a specific 
alteration in the monitoring of own performance (Carter et al., 2001). The authors infer that 
this disturbance could be considered as a potential mechanism for psychotic symptoms in 
which putatively self-generated actions are attributed to an external agent, e.g., inner speech 
is mistaken for an external voice. Hence, in view of the possible attributional bias related to 
voice hearing it could be beneficial to investigate cortical activation in combination with 
cognitive insight in patients with solitary hallucinations.  
 
4.2.6   Verbal memory is related to cognitive insight 
Cognitive insight and neurocognition appears to have a conceptual overlap, but whether this 
can be supported by empirical data has been scarcely investigated. In study II and III of the 
thesis we found that insight of illness and delusions correlated moderately with cognitive 
insight. In study IV these clinical features were considered to have potential confounding 
effect in the relationship between cognitive insight and neurocognition. Reports on the 
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relationship between depression and cognitive insight, however, have been somewhat 
inconsistent. A significant positive relationship has been found (Beck et al., 2004), but other 
authors did not report similar relationships (Pedrelli et al., 2004; Warman et al., 2007). 
Additionally, illness duration could confound the relationship between cognitive insight and 
neurocognition in schizophrenia.  
We found no association between self-reflectiveness and neurocognitive test 
performance in the fourth study of the thesis. Self-certainty, on the other hand, showed a 
significant negative correlation with both verbal learning and IQ. The common denominator 
of the items in Self-certainty is “confidence in own beliefs”. As flexibility of thought and use 
of corrective feedback are essential to general intellectual abilities a negative association 
between self-certainty and IQ was anticipated. A significant negative correlation was found 
between the two; yet, IQ did not contribute uniquely to self-certainty when controlling for 
insight of illness, depression and delusions. Verbal learning, on the other hand, made a 
specific contribution in explaining self-certainty independently of potential confounders. 
Hence, our data suggests that the role of verbal learning impairments on “confidence in own 
beliefs” is not confounded by insight of illness, depression or delusions. Interestingly, in a 
study by Brebion and colleagues depression seemed to be the main predictor of verbal 
memory (Brebion et al., 2001). This finding taken together with the significant negative 
correlation between depression and self-certainty found in study IV of the dissertation further 
underscores the association of verbal learning to self-certainty. The contribution by verbal 
learning is almost unaltered before and after controlling for the clinical features. The findings 
in study IV may lead to some speculations about the relationship between verbal learning and 
self-certainty. Possibly, a level of immediate learning is needed to evaluate own aberrant 
ideas and to apply self-correction strategies. Individuals with impairments in verbal learning 
may have difficulties with the continuous comparison and adjustment between acquired 
learned material and held beliefs, and, thus, alternative explanations may not be sufficiently 
facilitated causing enhanced restricted bias towards oneself. 
The relationship between cognitive insight and neurocognition was studied in 60 
patients with first episode psychosis (Lepage et al., 2008; Buchy et al., 2009a), and verbal 
learning and memory was positively associated with self-reflectiveness and negatively 
associated with self-certainty. Hence, our findings are in line with the previously found 
negative association between self-certainty and verbal learning and memory, but inconsistent 
with the finding regarding self-reflectiveness and verbal learning and memory. Further, we 
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found that cognitive insight scores were not associated with duration of illness. Thus, a 
comparison of the two studies should not be restricted by the difference in mean illness 
duration. However, the sample size of the Buchy-study indicates rather limited statistical 
power and inferences cannot be drawn.  To our knowledge the study IV of the thesis is the 
first report on cognitive insight and neurocognition taking other clinical characteristics into 
account, and these findings need replication.  
 
 
4.3 Strengths and limitations of the study 
The studies of this thesis have several strengths. The naturalistic and cross-sectional study 
design with sustained multisite recruitment of outpatients and inpatients from 
acute,intermediate and long-term treatment units over a long period of time facilitated 
inclusion of patients with broad psychopathology. The inclusion criteria were fairly wide, and 
patients in the study were well-characterized and the clinical data had high reliability. 
Overall, the samples of the study consisted of ethnically homogenous, relatively young 
patients with an even gender distribution and low mean illness duration. Therein, the 
frequently encountered methodological issues of chronicity and institutionalization in patients 
participating in clinical research were minimized.  
In the study we found high overall agreement for the diagnostic categories. The inter-
rater reliability was high for both PANSS and GAF scores. Further, the psychometric 
properties of the clinical instruments used in both the assessment of clinical and cognitive 
insight were tested in the first part of the current work, allowing clarification of 
methodological strengths and weaknesses at an early stage of the research. In the somewhat 
explorative approach of study III and IV, addressing relationships between cognitive insight 
and clinical dimensions, one could then make use of, on the one hand, clinical measures with 
established reliability such as the PANSS, on the other hand, draw on more recently 
developed measures characterized through own research. The assessment of patients on 
various clinical features pivotal to schizophrenia enabled us to make use of a model of the 
cognitive insight-neurocogniton relationship taking potential confounding factors into 
account. 
There are also several limitations in the current work. The relationship between 
measures of clinical and cognitive insight has been examined in previous studies, as well as 
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in study II of the thesis. A moderate correlation was found between the two, indicating that 
the BCIS represent a dimension different from insight of illness. Though, as there is no 
golden standard or even no other instrument to apply for means of comparison the validity of 
the BCIS cannot be estimated. In study III we hypothesized that intact cognitive insight might 
reflect awareness of the voices’ origin in patients with schizophrenia. Patients with solitary 
hallucinations might represent a subgroup of patients with better insight of illness and less 
negative symptoms. Due to low statistical power neurocognitive performance could not be 
further investigated in this subgroup. Outcome measures such as employment, education or 
social adjustment have not been assessed in the group of patients with solitary hallucinations 
or in any of the other three clinical subgroups in study III. The relationship between cognitive 
insight and neurocognition addressed in study IV was not investigated in a healthy control 
group, thus, it is difficult to make inferences on the specificity of the findings. The 
relationship between personality traits and cognitive insight has not been approached in the 
thesis. 
 
4.4  Implications 
As cognitive insight has been operationalized quite recently the research in this field is not 
conclusive. Nonetheless, cognitive insight seems to be a dimension complimentary to the 
clinically established insight of illness. Clinical insight has especially demonstrated its 
usefulness in the evaluation of patients’ adherence to treatment. However, after three to four 
decades of research its diagnostic use and also the relationship to central features in 
schizophrenia are still uncertain.  
The studies of this dissertation suggest the feasibility of cognitive insight in the 
evaluation of psychotic beliefs and experiences in patients with schizophrenia and bipolar I 
disorder. The initial work of endorsing the psychometric properties of the cognitive insight 
measure (BCIS) has been followed by exploring the relationship between cognitive insight 
and clinical characteristics in schizophrenia. Hence, the studies in this thesis contribute to a 
methodological and also a phenomenological basis for the utility of cognitive insight in 
clinical settings. The findings are suggestive of a moderate association between cognitive 
insight and central characteristics in schizophrenia such as delusions, verbal learning and 
insight of illness. Previous research in patients with delusions has indicated that the 
“possibility of being mistaken” about their delusional beliefs could be predictive of 
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improvement in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (Garety et al., 1997). At a conceptual level the 
“possibility of being mistaken” reflects mental flexibility as part of cognitive insight. In a 
treatment intervention study patients with schizophrenia who received “treatment as usual” 
plus (cognitive behavioral) social skills training showed greater cognitive insight after 
treatment than the patients in the “treatment as usual” group (Granholm et al., 2005). The 
authors inferred that cognitive insight is a possible mediator of positive symptom outcome in 
cognitive behavioral therapy. Taken together with our findings the group of schizophrenia 
patients exhibiting no current delusions and the group with solitary hallucinations might be 
relatively apt to improve their course of illness.  
Cognitive insight seems to contribute to our understanding of reasoning and decision-
making in patients with psychotic symptoms. We found that the evaluation of both delusions 
and hallucinations is essential when appraising reasoning style. Delusions are interlinked with 
poor cognitive insight, whereas the occurrence of solitary hallucinations is possibly 
associated with high cognitive insight. In the absence of longitudinal data, however, patients’ 
potential to improve their cognitive insight is not known. Nonetheless, our findings suggest 
that a detailed description of both current delusions and hallucinations is useful when seeking 
to understand aberrant beliefs, experiences and cognitions. In patients with auditory 
hallucinations the level of cognitive insight may indicate whether the voices are externally 
attributed, but more research involving cognitive insight and also the externalizing bias – 
cognitive insight relationship is clearly needed. Moreover, impairments in verbal learning 
seem to be connected with poor reasoning style, but, again, more studies are required before 
drawing conclusions. 
 
4.5  Future research  
Patients may become depressed if considering themselves as mentally ill or psychotic. This 
clinical observation is underscored by empirical findings showing that improvement of 
clinical insight in patients with psychosis coincide with increased depression. Nonetheless, 
we found that cognitive insight was not associated with depression. Treatment approaches 
targeting the reasoning style may lead to an increased understanding of the psychotic 
experience, while possibly decreasing the depression. The underlying mechanisms for these 
relationships should be studied in future research. In the current work we found that the 
measure of clinical insight (Birchwood Insight Scale) could not be applied in the assessment 
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of different insight dimensions. Thus, the relationship between these dimensions and self-
reflectiveness and self-certainty has not been sufficiently investigated in the studies of this 
thesis. It has been suggested that relabelling of symptoms may be more universal or hard-
wired than the other dimensions of clinical insight, and, thus, perhaps related to self-
monitoring (David and Kircher, 2003). The relations between clinical insight, cognitive 
insight and self-monitoring need to be addressed in future investigations.  
The contributions of reasoning styles have been extensively studied in the formation 
and retention of delusions. However, the frequent co-occurrence of delusions and 
hallucinations has facilitated theories of common pathways in the symptom formation. 
Investigating attributional bias in patients hearing voices could to be one way of addressing 
such a possible interlink. We have suggested that cognitive insight taking the individual’s 
reflection upon own unusual experiences and  judgment, as well as overconfidence in beliefs 
into account could be a fruitful approach in acquiring further knowledge on the formation of 
psychotic  symptoms. However, an important next step would be to clarify the relations 
between cognitive insight, self-monitoring and approaches of attributional bias. The role of 
these features in the formation of hallucinations and delusions could be further explored 
using neuroimaging techniques.  
Patients with solitary hallucinations showed high clinical insight and few negative 
symptoms, however these clinical characteristics were not significantly different from the 
other 3 groups with different constellations of psychotic symptoms. Insight of illness and 
psychopathology, in addition to neurocognitive performance in patients with hallucinations 
and/or delusions should be addressed in future studies, preferably in a large sample of 
patients with schizophrenia.  
We found that high self-certainty is associated with poor verbal learning. The neural 
correlates of cognitive insight have to our knowledge been explored in one neuroimaging 
study, suggesting that cognitive insight is related to cortical changes in areas essential for 
memory. The authors found that low self-certainty is related to diminished  bilateral 
hippocampal volumes (Buchy et al., 2009a) -  a finding which seems consistent with the 
results in our study, but this research also needs replication.  
Whether cognitive insight represents a “trait” or “state” phenomenon is not known. 
Longitudinal studies could contribute to gain knowledge about how and to what degree 
cognitive insight changes with current symptom load, or is stable over time. Implementation 
of functional outcome measures, as well as assessments of psychopathology in future long-
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term treatment studies could represent important steps to clarify whether cognitive insight can 
predict improvement in psychotic symptoms.  
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5  Conclusions 
 
  Acceptable psychometric properties were obtained for the sum score of Birchwood 
Insight Scale - a self-report used in the assessment of clinical insight - when applied to 
patients with schizophrenia and bipolar I disorder. For patients with bipolar II disorder 
the scale seemed to work poorly.  
 The level of insight was similar in patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. 
 Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) - a self-report measuring cognitive insight – 
showed acceptable psychometric properties for patients with schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorders. The level of cognitive insight was similar in the two patient groups. 
Healthy controls cannot be compared to patient scores without excluding items 
referring to psychotic experiences. The BCIS subscales, self-reflectiveness and self-
certainty, showed low or moderate intercorrelation for patients with schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorders, as well as control subjects, indicating that they represent two 
different dimensions of cognitive insight.  
 Delusions irrespective of the presence or absence of hallucinations were associated 
with low self-reflectiveness and high self-certainty, reflecting low cognitive insight.   
 A subgroup of patients with schizophrenia exhibiting solitary hallucinations seemed 
to have high cognitive insight.  
 Low self-certainty was associated with high IQ and verbal learning in schizophrenia. 
Verbal learning made a specific contribution in explaining self-certainty also when 
potential confounders were taken into account. 
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6  Errata 
 
Under Summary of study, page 7, last paragraph, it is written “..low cognitive insight is 
associated with high IQ and low verbal learning”. The word high should be replaced with 
low. The correct wording is: “..low cognitive insight is associated with low IQ and low verbal 
learning”.  
 
In paper 3 under Material and Methods, Participants, page 2, paragraph 1, it is written: 
“From May 2003 through July 2007, the present study was conducted in outpatient and 
inpatient psychiatric units at 4 University Hospitals in Oslo..”. The period of patient 
recruitment is incorrect and should be replaced by the period March 2005 through July 2007.   
 
 
 
Oslo, January 2011 
John A. Engh 
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  Figure 1.  Birchwood Insight Scale (IS) 
1. Some of the symptoms were made by my 
mind 
Agree very 
much 
Agree Unsure  Disagree Disagree 
very much 
2. I am mentally well      
3. I do not need medication      
4. My stay in hospital was necessary      
5. The doctor is right in prescribing 
medication for me 
     
6. I do not need to be seen by a doctor or 
psychiatrist 
     
7. If someone said I had a nervous or mental 
illness then they would be right 
     
8. None of the unusual things I experienced 
are due to an illness 
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 Figure 2.  Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) 
 Do not 
agree at all 
Agree 
slightly 
Agree a lot  Agree 
completely 
Self-reflectiveness 
1. At times I have misunderstood other people’s attitudes 
towards me 
3. Other people may be more objective about the cause of my 
unpleasant experiences than I am. 
4. I have jumped to conclusions too fast. 
5. Some of may experiences that seemed very real may have 
been due to my imagination. 
6. Some of the ideas that I was certain were true turned out to 
be false. 
8. Even though I feel strongly that I was right I could be wrong. 
12.    If somebody points out that my beliefs are wrong I am       
         willing to consider it. 
14.    There is often more than one possible explanation     
          for why people act the way they do 
15.    My unusual experiences may be due to me being  
         extremely upset or stressed. 
    
Self-certainty 
2. My interpretations of my experiences are definitively right. 
7. If something feels right, it means that it is right. 
9. I know better than anyone else what my problems are. 
10.   When people disagree with me, they are generally  
        wrong. 
11.   I cannot trust other people’s opinion about my  
        experiences. 
13.   I can trust my own judgement at all times. 
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Abstract
Background: Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) has been designed for assessment of self-
reflection on patients' anomalous experiences and interpretations of own beliefs. The scale has
been developed and validated for patients with schizophrenia. We wanted to study the utility of
the scale for patients with bipolar disorder. The relationship between the BCIS as a measure of
cognitive insight and established methods for assessment of insight of illness was explored in both
diagnostic groups.
Methods: The BCIS self-report inventory was administered to patients with schizophrenia (n =
143), bipolar disorder (n = 92) and controls (n = 64). The 15 items of the inventory form two
subscales, self-reflectiveness and self-certainty.
Results: The internal consistency of the subscales was good for the patient groups and the
controls. The mean subscale scores were not significantly different for the three groups. Four items
in subscale self-reflectiveness referring to psychotic experiences gave, however, different results in
the control subjects. Self-certainty and scores on insight item PANSS correlated significantly in the
schizophrenia, but not in the bipolar group.
Conclusion: BCIS with its two subscales seems applicable for patients with bipolar disorder as
well as for patients with schizophrenia. The self-report inventory can also be applied to control
subjects if the items referring to psychotic experiences are omitted. In schizophrenia high scores
on self-certainty is possibly associated with poor insight of illness. For the bipolar group the
subscales are largely independent of traditional insight measures.
Background
Insight of illness is an important aspect in diagnostics and
treatment of patients with severe mental disorders. Focus
has primarily been on awareness of illness and treatment
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needs based on the widely used definition by Anthony
David [1]. Aaron T. Beck labeled this clinical insight [2]. In
addition to attenuated clinical insight, patients with psy-
chosis often have reduced capacity to reflect rationally on
their anomalous experiences and to recognize that their
conclusions are incorrect [2]. Beck termed such insight
cognitive insight. He summarized the relevant components
of this concept as "impairment of objectivity about the
cognitive distortions, loss of ability to put these into per-
spective, resistance to corrective information from others
and overconfidence in conclusions [2]."
To measure cognitive insight, he developed the Beck Cog-
nitive Insight Scale (BCIS), a 15 item self-report instru-
ment with two subscales, self-reflectiveness and self-
certainty (Beck 2004). Acceptable levels of internal con-
sistency (alpha self-reflectiveness 0.68, alpha self-certainty
0.60) were found for a mixed sample of patients with
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder and major depres-
sion [2]. For middle-aged and older patients with schizo-
phrenia and schizoaffective disorder, acceptable internal
consistency was later confirmed for self-reflectiveness
(alpha 0.70), but not for self-certainty (alpha 0.50) [3].
The introduction of the BCIS has provided an opportunity
to explore cognitive insight among patients with schizo-
phrenia. Beck and colleagues recruited 150 inpatients, 75
diagnosed with schizophrenia and schizoaffective disor-
der and 75 with major depressive disorder. Twenty-one
per cent in the latter group had psychotic depression. The
authors [2] showed that the subscale self-certainty differ-
entiated between major depressive patients with and
without psychosis. However, the BCIS has not yet been
validated for patients with bipolar I and bipolar II disor-
der, in whom lack of insight may also be a major clinical
problem. We have earlier demonstrated that a self-report
questionnaire assessing insight of illness with good psy-
chometric properties for patients with schizophrenia may
not necessarily function as well for patients with bipolar
disorders [4]. It is therefore important to study the psy-
chometric qualities of the BCIS also for this patient group.
Self-reflectiveness and self-certainty comprise items that
seem to be rather general in content. Possibly, the two
subscales cover a spectrum from normality to pathology.
Warman et al.[5] have recently published an article which
points out that the factor loadings and internal consisten-
cies of the BCIS were similar for healthy controls and the
two groups of inpatients in Beck's original paper. We
intended to replicate the investigation of the subscales'
utility for normal controls.
The aims of the present study were: 1) to examine the sub-
scale scores, internal consistency and intercorrelation of
the BCIS' subscales for the schizophrenia group, the bipo-
lar group and for normal controls, 2) to explore the rela-
tionship between the BCIS and affective symptom scores,
and established scales for assessment of insight for the
two diagnostic groups, and 3) to compare mean scores for
patients and controls.
Methods
The subjects participated in a large ongoing study on
schizophrenia and bipolar disorders (TOP Study, The-
matic Organized Psychoses Research) and were recruited
from out-patient and in-patient psychiatric units at four
University Hospitals in Oslo, Norway, from March, 2005
through July, 2007. The health care system is catchment
area based and the patients are referred from primary care.
The patients were invited to participate in the study by the
clinician responsible for their treatment.
All participants gave written informed consent, and the
study was approved by the Regional Committee for Med-
ical Research Ethics and the Norwegian Data Inspectorate.
Participants
The inclusion criteria were as follows: age 18 to 65 years,
able to understand and speak a Scandinavian language,
meeting the DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia, schizoaf-
fective, schizophreniform or bipolar disorder, no history
of severe head trauma, IQ score of above 70 and willing
and able to give informed consent. A total of 235 patients
met the criteria. The schizophrenia group consisted of 143
patients with the DSM-IV diagnoses schizophrenia (n =
107), schizophreniform disorder (n = 10), and schizoaf-
fective disorder (n = 26). Ninety-two patients were
included in the bipolar group, diagnosed with either
bipolar I disorder (n = 45), bipolar II disorder (n = 43) or
bipolar NOS (n = 4). Sixty-four healthy subjects took part
in the control group. Twenty-seven of these individuals
were randomly selected from statistical records from the
same catchment area as the patients. The remaining 37
persons were a mixed group of volunteering professionals.
Detailed analyses of the subscale scores and intra class
correlation showed similar results in the two control sam-
ples, and hence we refer only to one control group in this
article.
Diagnosis was established using the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-IV-TR-axis I disorders (SCID-I) [6]. All
interviewers finished a training course in SCID assessment
based on the training program at UCLA [7] and partici-
pated in diagnostic evaluation meetings on regular basis
led by a clinically experienced professor in psychiatry
(S.O.). Mean overall kappa for SCID diagnoses assessed
by the UCLA was 0.77 (95 % CI: 0.60–0.94).
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Measures
General assessments
History of mental illness, present symptoms, life style,
and pharmacological treatment were obtained from inter-
view with the patient, with additional information col-
lected from treatment records and clinical staff. Severity of
symptoms was assessed by the Positive and Negative Syn-
drome Scale PANSS (PANSS) [8], the Young Mania Rating
Scale-Clinician rated (YMRS-C) [9] and the Inventory of
Depressive Symptoms-Clinician rated (IDS-C) [10]. The
assessment of depression was conducted partly with the
Inventory of Depressive Symptoms-Clinician rated (IDS-
C), partly with CDSS (Calgary Depression Scale), but only
the former scores are utilized in the study. Hence, there is
a discrepancy between the number of patients with IDS
scores and the number of patients with other symptom
scores (PANSS, YMRS). Psychosocial functioning was
measured by the Global Assessment of Functioning Scale
(GAF) [11,12], and the scores were split into scales of
symptoms (GAF-S) and function (GAF-F) to improve psy-
chometric properties. The inter-rater reliability of the
investigators was good for the GAF with an intra class cor-
relation, ICC 1.1, of 0.86 [13].
Assessment of cognitive insight and insight of illness
The BCIS is a self-report inventory consisting of 15 state-
ments rated on a 4-point Likert scale (0 = do not agree at
all to 3 = agree completely). Based on factor analyses Beck
and coworkers divided the 15 items into 2 subscales (Fig-
ure 1). The first component consisted of 9 items measur-
ing objectivity, reflectiveness and openness to feedback
and given the label self-reflectiveness. Under the umbrella
of decision-making and resistance to feedback, 6 items
were united in a second component of the scale, labeled
self-certainty. High scores on the subscale self-reflective-
ness and low scores on subscale self-certainty is consid-
ered as normal. With approval from the authors the
inventory was translated from English into Norwegian
and the procedure was reversed under blinded conditions
back into English. The questionnaire was administered
without a time limit.
BCIS subscalesFigure 1
BCIS subscales.
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Insight of illness was assessed for both diagnostic groups
by the PANSS insight item (G12) [14]. A score of three or
higher was defined as poor insight of illness.
Patient characteristics
Table 1 gives an overview of demographic and clinical
characteristics for the two patient groups. The proportion
of men in the schizophrenia group was significantly larger
than in the control group. Subjects in the schizophrenia
group were significantly younger than the bipolar
patients. Additionally, the subjects in the schizophrenia
group had significantly higher scores on symptom meas-
ures (PANSS delusions, PANSS hallucinations, PANSS
pos., PANSS neg., PANSS total) and also larger variability
than in the bipolar group. Sixty-four of the patients in the
schizophrenia sample (44.8 per cent) obtained scores
above cut off (4 or higher) on items PANSS delusions
and/or PANSS hallucinations, where as only 4 patients in
the bipolar sample (4.3 per cent) attained scores above cut
off. Similarly GAF-S and GAF-F were significantly lower in
the schizophrenia group than in the bipolar group, with
mean scores in the schizophrenia group reflecting a symp-
tom level bordering psychosis. The variance for both GAF-
measures was lower in the schizophrenia group. The
mean score on G12 was significantly higher in the schizo-
phrenia group than in the bipolar group, pointing toward
poorer insight of illness in the former group. Fifty per cent
of the patients in the schizophrenia group and 14 per cent
of the bipolar patients obtained G12 scores reflecting
poor insight of illness.
Statistics
For the statistical analysis we used SPSS version 13. Stu-
dent-t-test was utilized for examining statistical signifi-
cance between the two patient groups on clinical
variables. ANOVA and post-hoc tests were used when
comparing all three groups on age and gender distribu-
tion, in addition to comparison of BCIS scores.
Few patients had missing data on the BCIS. The missing
items were scattered on the various items in both sub-
scales. On the average there were 1.5 total missing regis-
trations per item for each of the patient groups. For the
controls there was a clear difference between the sub-
scales, as 14.3 % had omitted self-reflectiveness items, but
only 3.1 % had left out self-certainty items. For PANSS
total and YMRS total score there were 2 and 1 missing reg-
istrations respectively in the schizophrenia sample and 1
and 4 in the bipolar sample.
The internal consistency for the two subscales was calcu-
lated as Cronbach's alpha for the two diagnostic groups
and for the controls. We followed the recommendations
by Nunally that a satisfactory alpha equals or is higher
than 0.70 [14].
The average correlation between each item and the
remaining items within the subscale (corrected item total
correlation, CITC) was also calculated. Furthermore, we
computed the subscale intercorrelation for the different
diagnostic groups. Finally, self-reflectiveness and self-cer-
tainty of the BCIS were correlated with scores on the G12
using the Pearson correlation test.
Results
Psychometric properties and scale scores of the BCIS
As shown in Table 2 alpha for self-reflectiveness was the
same for all groups. Alpha for self-certainty, displayed in
Table 3, was somewhat lower, but equally consistent
across groups.
We found no significant difference in mean scores for self-
reflectiveness or self-certainty in any of the groups. Addi-
Table 1: Demographic and clinical variables
Schizophrenia (1) n = 143 Bipolar disorder (2) n = 92 Controls (3) n = 64 1 vs. 2 1 vs. 3 2 vs. 3
Male 83 (58.0) 40 (43.5) 25 (39.1) n.s <0.05 n.s.
Age 32.5 (9.5) 37.2 (11.4) 33.7 (11.7) <0.05 n.s. n.s.
GAF-S 42.8 (11.4) 61.2 (12.1) <0.001
GAF-F 43.8 (10.9) 61.6 (14.3) <0.001
PANSS delusions 3.0 (1.7) 1.4 (0.9) <0.001
PANSS hallucinations 2.6 (1.7) 1.2 (0.8) <0.001
PANSS pos 14.7 (5.9) 9.1 (2.9) <0.001
PANSS neg 14.4 (5.5) 10.1 (3.7) <0.001
PANSS total 58.3 (16.6) 43.6 (10.9) <0.001
IDS-C total 17.0 (12.5) 15.8 (12.6) n.s.
PANSS insight 2.6 (1.5) 1.5 (1.0) <0.001
Male, per cent in parenthesis; for other variables, standard deviation in parenthesis; GAF-S, Global Assessment of Functioning – Symptom scale; 
Global Assessment of Functioning – Function scale; PANSS, Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale, delusions item, hallucinations item, positive 
symptoms subscale, negative symptoms subscale, total score; IDS-C, Inventory of Depressive Symptoms Scale-Clinician and PANSS insight item.
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tionally, both subscales showed similar variance in all
groups.
BCIS subscales divided according to content
The similar subscale scores attained in all groups was
unexpected. An obvious question would be if the state-
ments in the various items were understood differently by
the groups. The high percentage of self-reflectiveness
items omitted by the controls indicated that the subscale
contained items which were conceived differently among
these subjects than among the patients. We found that
item 3, 5, 6 and 15 were left out to a large degree and that
these items consisted of statements which could be inter-
preted as referring to psychotic experiences and, therefore
difficult to answer by the control subjects. Self-reflective-
ness was split into component I, consisting of these patho-
logical experiences, and component II comprising the
remaining items. As shown in Table 4 the mean score for
component I was significantly lower for the controls than
for both the schizophrenia and the bipolar group. The cor-
relations between the mean scores of the two components
were 0.55, 0.40 and 0.52 for the schizophrenia group, the
bipolar group and controls respectively, indicating mod-
erate to strong relationships.
Relationship between scores on BCIS and 
psychopathology
There was no significant association between self-reflec-
tiveness and YMRS total score or between self-reflective-
ness and IDS total score in schizophrenia. For Self-
certainty, however, we found a significant relationship to
YMRS total score in this group. We did not find a signifi-
cant association between any of the BCIS subscales and
these measures of affective symptoms in the bipolar
group. The relationship between the BCIS subscales and
PANSS positive in the bipolar group was also nonsignifi-
cant.
Sixteen of the subjects diagnosed with bipolar disorder
reported one or more previous psychotic episodes. These
subjects attained scores on component I and II which
were similar to the scores in the group of remaining sub-
jects in the bipolar sample.
We wanted to investigate if there was a difference in self-
reflectiveness and self-certainty scores between inpatients
and outpatients. In a subsample of 78 schizophrenia
patients no difference was found on self-reflectiveness or
self-certainty scores. There were very few hospitalized
bipolar patients and hence the comparison was unfeasi-
ble.
Comparing BCIS and measures of insight
As displayed in Table 5 and 6 the correlation between self-
reflectiveness and self-certainty was low for the schizo-
phrenia group and significant for the bipolar group.
We calculated the correlation between self-reflectiveness,
self-certainty and G12 score and found a highly significant
positive correlation between self-certainty and G12 for
schizophrenia.
Discussion
The main finding was that the psychometric properties of
both subscales of the BCIS were acceptable for the schizo-
phrenia and for the bipolar group. The scores of the con-
Table 2: Internal consistency
Schizophrenia n = 143 Bipolar disorder n = 92 Controls n = 64
Cronbach's alpha CITC Cronbach's alpha CITC Cronbach's alpha CITC
Self-reflectiveness 0.72 0.39 0.73 0.40 0.73 0.41
Self-certainty 0.63 0.36 0.61 0.35 0.63 0.38
CITC, Corrected Item Total Correlation
Table 3: Subscale scores
Schizophrenia (1) Bipolar disorder (2) Controls (3) 1 vs. 2 1 vs. 3 2 vs. 3
N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. p p p
Self-reflectiveness 143 14.5 4.8 92 14.7 4.7 64 13.4 4.3 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Self-certainty 143 8.2 3.4 92 7.4 3.0 64 8.0 2.7 n.s. n.s. n.s.
S.D., standard deviation.
BMC Psychiatry 2007, 7:71 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/7/71
Page 6 of 7
(page number not for citation purposes)
trols, however, can not be compared to patient scores
without excluding items referring to psychotic experi-
ences. Furthermore, the two subscales self-reflectiveness
and self-certainty showed low or moderate correlation for
the three groups, indicating that they represent two differ-
ent dimensions of cognitive insight.
Internal consistency for each subscale of the BCIS was
consistent across groups, somewhat higher for self-reflec-
tiveness than for self-certainty. Previous findings for the
schizophrenia group [2,3] were thereby replicated. These
findings are also in line with the results by Warman et
al.[5] which point out that the factor loadings and internal
consistencies of the BCIS were similar for healthy controls
and the two groups of inpatients in Beck's original paper.
To our knowledge the psychometric properties of the BCIS
have not previously been published for a bipolar sample.
The psychometric properties of the BCIS were similar for
normal controls to what we found in schizophrenia and
bipolar disorder. However, the self-reflectiveness scores in
the two patient groups were actually higher than in the
control group, although not statistically significant.Simi-
lar findings concerning scores on subscale self-reflective-
ness was found in a recent study by Warman et al.[5]
comparing scores of undergraduate students with patients
diagnosed with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder.
In this study the controls scored non-significantly lower
on self-reflectiveness and significantly lower on self-cer-
tainty than subjects in the schizophrenia group. Similarly,
in a study by Eric Granholm (personal communication)
middle aged and older controls obtained self-reflective-
ness and self-certainty scores that were lower than the
patient scores in the Beck study.
We wanted to investigate if different scoring profiles were
present in the three groups. Comparing scores across these
groups on component I which includes "unusual experi-
ences" disclosed a significantly lower score for controls
than both patient groups. This discrepancy indicates that
the control subjects interpret the statements of these par-
ticular items rather differently from the patients, which is
understandable due to lack of psychotic experiences in
this group. Control subjects and patients seem to have a
different reference point for 4 out of the 9 items in self-
reflectiveness. This implies that comparison of scores
between control subjects and patients should be carried
out only for component II. On the other hand, the two
components within self-reflectiveness were fairly strongly
correlated for all groups, and consequently, there was no
clear indication that they constitute two separate dimen-
sions. Provided that the scores of the controls are not
compared with patients whose interpretation of items
involving "unusual experiences" are likely to be different,
all items in subscale self-reflectiveness might be applica-
ble for controls for means of investigating relations
between cognitive insight and other domains such as psy-
chopathology.
We also investigated the scores on each of these compo-
nents in our bipolar sample and found that the patients
with and without previous psychotic episodes did not
come out differently. This could be considered as addi-
tional support to the applicability of the scale in bipolar
samples.
Self-reflectiveness and self-certainty were weakly or mod-
erately intercorrelated in the groups suggesting that they
represent different dimensions. Self-certainty showed a
highly significant positive correlation with G12 scores in
Table 6: Correlation coefficients between scores of cognitive 
insight and insight of illness for bipolar disorder.
Self-reflectiveness Self-certainty
Self-certainty -0.21*
PANSS insight -0.03 0.15
*p < 0.05
Table 5: Correlation coefficients between scores of cognitive 
insight and insight of illness for schizophrenia.
Self-reflectiveness Self-certainty
Self-certainty -0.13
PANSS insight -0.21* 0.38**
*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
Table 4: Self-reflectiveness divided in two components.
Schizophrenia (1) Bipolar disorder (2) Controls (3) 1 vs 2 1 vs 3 2 vs 3
N Mean pr item SD N Mean pr item SD N Mean pr item SD p p p
Component I 143 1.34 0.72 92 1.19 0.72 64 0.86 0.64 n.s. <0.001 <0.05
Component II 143 1.83 0.52 92 1.99 0.55 64 1.98 0.48 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Component I, items referring to psychotic experiences; Component II, remaining items.
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the schizophrenia group, indicating that mental inflexibil-
ity is possibly associated with poor clinical insight of ill-
ness. For self-reflectiveness a significant negative
correlation was found for this group, suggesting that the
capacity to reflect on anomalous experiences is linked to
insight of illness. Further exploration of self-certainty
could expand our knowledge of cognitive processes
involved in insight of illness in general, and in particular
comprehending patients' lack of insight related to treat-
ment need. The relationship between poor mental flexi-
bility and both symptoms and cognition are not known,
and investigating these associations could represent
important topics for future studies.
Conclusion
The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) with its two sub-
scales self-reflectiveness and self-certainty seems applica-
ble for patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorders.
The BCIS can also be applied to control subjects, but in
the case of comparison between controls and other clini-
cal samples the four items referring to psychotic experi-
ences should not be used. Our findings indicate that self-
reflectiveness and self-certainty represent independent
domains. In schizophrenia high self-certainty and low
self-reflectiveness seem to be associated with poor insight
of illness.
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1. Introduction  
Insight of illness encompasses the patient’s awareness of symptoms as abnormal, attributing 
symptoms as well as social consequences to a mental disorder and recognizing the need for 
treatment (Amador et al., 1993;David, 1990). The clinical concept of insight is considered a 
multidimensional concept (Vaz et al., 2002) distributed on a continuum (Cooke et al., 2005) 
which has been valuable for determining the presence of mental illness and its prognosis, as 
well as prescribing appropriate treatment and management (Mintz et al., 2003). However, 
patients with psychosis might not only suffer from distorted beliefs and experiences, but are 
also relatively unable to reflect on them rationally and use corrective feedback (Beck et al., 
2004). Patients’ capacity and willingness to observe their mental productions and to consider 
alternative explanations and their confidence in their beliefs has been designated cognitive 
insight (Beck et al., 2004). Cognitive insight can be measured with a reliable self-report, the 
Beck Cognitive Insight Scale. It has two components, self-reflectiveness measuring 
objectivity and reflectiveness and openness to feedback and self-certainty measuring mental 
flexibility or confidence in own beliefs. Weak to moderate associations have been found 
between these two subscales and Birchwood’s measure of  insight in schizophrenia (Engh et 
al., 2007;Pedrelli et al., 2004;Beck et al., 2004), indicating that cognitive and clinical insight 
represent different domains. 
 
Neurocognitive dysfunction is a key characteristic of schizophrenia (Heinrichs and Zakzanis, 
1998;Keefe et al., 2006). To our knowledge there are only two reports on the relationship 
between neurocognition and cognitive insight. In the first study, a significant relationship 
between self-certainty and verbal learning and memory was found in 51 patients with first 
episode psychosis (Lepage et al., 2008). After a modest enlargement of the patient sample the 
strength of this relationship was somewhat attenuated, whereas the relationship between self-
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reflectiveness and verbal learning and memory was strengthened (Buchy et al., 2009a). 
However, this study did not control for important confounders. In the present study we 
investigated the relationship between cognitive insight and neurocognition in a larger sample 
of patients with schizophrenia taking potential confounders into account. There is a body of 
literature on the relationship between neurocognition and positive symptoms in 
schizophrenia, and a recent review showed no reliable association between the two 
(Dominguez et al., 2009). Few studies have, however, examined the specific relationships 
between neurocognition and delusions and hallucinations. Investigating the relationship 
between each of these positive symptoms and cognitive insight in schizophrenia the 
occurrence of delusions seems to be associated with low self-reflectiveness and high self-
certainty in schizophrenia (Engh et al., 2009) (Buchy et al., 2009b). Hallucinations were not 
associated with either of the two cognitive insight dimensions (Engh et al., 2009). Yet, there 
are other potential confounders in the relationship between cognitive insight and 
neurocognition. One of these is depression. In a study investigating cognitive insight and 
depression, a significant positive relationship between self-reflectiveness and depression was 
found (Beck et al., 2004),  but others did not report similar relationships (Pedrelli et al., 
2004;Warman et al., 2007). In addition, illness duration could confound the relationship 
between cognitive insight and neurocognition in schizophrenia.  
 
Based on the conceptual content of cognitive insight and the suggestions from the previous 
studies, we hypothesized that confidence in own beliefs would be associated with poor verbal 
learning. Hence, the aim of the current study was to address the following questions: 1. Is 
there an association between cognitive insight and neurocognitive function in schizophrenia? 
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2. Can neurocognition add to explained variance in cognitive insight after contributions by 
potential confounders such as affective and psychotic symptoms have been accounted for? 
 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1 Participants 
One hundred and two patients (schizophrenia, n=81; schizophreniform disorder, n=8; 
schizoaffective disorder, n=13) participating in a large ongoing study on schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorders, the Thematic Organized Psychoses Research (TOP) Study, were included 
in the study. They were recruited from February, 2005 through May, 2007 in outpatient and 
inpatient psychiatric units at four University Hospitals in Oslo. These hospitals provide 
treatment for patients referred from primary care. The psychiatric units in Norway are 
catchment area based and publicly funded. Inclusion criteria were: age 18 - 65 years, 
understand and speak a Scandinavian language, no history of severe head trauma, obtain an 
IQ >70 and meeting DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia, schizoaffective or schizophreniform 
disorder. 
 
Table 1 gives an overview of demographic and clinical characteristics. Close to 60 % of the 
subjects in the study are males and more than two thirds are Caucasian. Their mean age is 
slightly above thirty years, and the mean level of education equivalents high-school 
completion. One-third of the patients (33 %) had used illicit drugs during the past 6 months. 
The mean illness duration, defined as the time since the first contact with a specialized public 
health care unit due to psychosis, was 3.6 years for all patients. Scores on Global Assessment 
of Functioning symptoms (GAFs) and Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) 
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reflected a severity of symptoms bordering on psychosis (see Measures). Ninety-seven % of 
the patients in the study were using antipsychotic medication.  
 
All participants gave written informed consent, and the study was approved by the Regional 
Committee for Medical Research Ethics and the Norwegian Data Inspectorate. 
 
Table 1 
 
2.2 Measures 
2.2.1 General Assessments 
Diagnosis was established using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR-axis I 
disorders (SCID-I) (Spitzer et al., 1992). All interviewers completed a training course in 
SCID assessment based on the training program at the University of California Los Angeles 
(Ventura et al., 1998) and were also supervised on a regular basis by an experienced 
researcher in the field of diagnostics in severe mental disorders (S.O.). Global symptoms and 
psychosocial functioning were measured by the Global Assessment of Functioning Scale 
(GAF) (Endicott et al., 1976), and the scores were split into scales of symptoms (GAF-s) and 
function (GAF-f) to improve psychometric properties (Pedersen et al., 2007). Severity of 
symptoms was assessed with the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) (Kay et al., 
1987). The PANSS delutions (item P1), PANSS hallucinations (item P3) and PANSS 
depression (item G6) were utilized to assess delutions, hallucinations and depression, 
respectively. In addition, the subscales PANSS negative and PANSS positive were used. The 
reliability was satisfactory for diagnosis (SCID-I), GAF and PANSS (For details see (Engh et 
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al., 2009)). 
  
2.2.2  Assessment of cognitive insight 
The BCIS is a self-report consisting of 15 statements forming two subscales, self-
reflectiveness and self-certainty. High scores on self-reflectiveness and low scores on self-
certainty is considered as normal. The questionnaire was administered without a time limit. 
Psychometric properties of both BCIS subscales were found acceptable for patients with 
schizophrenia (For details see (Beck et al., 2004;Engh et al., 2007)). 
 
2.2.3  Assessment of clinical insight  
Insight of illness was assessed using the Birchwood Insight Scale (IS), a self-report 
comprising 8 items. The total score has a range of 0 to 12, with a score of 9 or more 
indicating good insight. Previous studies have shown acceptable psychometric properties for 
the inventory (Birchwood et al., 1994;Jonsdottir et al., 2008). The reported correlation 
between IS total score and PANSS insight has been moderate to high (r=-0.54, p<0.01) 
(Jonsdottir et al., 2008). 
 
2.2.4  Neuropsychological tests 
A battery of neuropsychological tests covering five neuropsychological functions often 
compromised in schizophrenia was administered by trained psychologists. In addition, 
current general intellectual abilities were assessed (For details see (Simonsen et al., 2008)). 
Verbal learning was assessed with Logical Memory from the Wechsler Memory Scale 
(WMS-III). This test requires recollection of two short stories (Wechsler, 2007b). A total 
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score for the number of items immediately recalled from both stories was used to measure 
verbal learning. 
Processing speed was assessed with Digit Symbol Test from WAIS-III (Wechsler, 2003). 
The test is comprised by numbers paired with symbols, and the task is to fill in blank spaces 
with correct symbols within the time limit of 90 seconds.  
Attention was assessed with Digit Span from Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III). 
Both the forward and the backward version were presented for the patients. The former test 
requires the participant to repeat a number of digits in the same order as presented, and the 
latter version entails repetition of a number of digits in the backward order of presentation. 
The total score (summation of digits repeated forwards and backwards) was used.  
Verbal fluency was operationalized with Verbal Fluency Letter Test from the Delis Kaplan 
Executive Functioning Scale (D-KEFS) (Delis, 2005). The subtest consists of three trials, 
requiring production of words beginning with the letters ‘F’, ‘A’, and ‘S’. The number of 
words generated in each of the trials was used as measures of verbal fluency.  
Inhibition was assessed with the Color-Word Interference Test from D-KEFS. The test 
consists of four trials. In the first two trials the subject is required to name the colored ink 
patches and to read the printed color names displayed on separate cards as rapidly as possible. 
In the two subsequent trials the cards presented consist of written names of colors printed in 
colored ink that is incongruent with the color name itself. The time taken to name the color of 
the ink was included as the measure of inhibition (third trial D-KEFS).  
Full scale IQ: Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) was used to assess full 
scale IQ (Wechsler, 2007a). The following subtests were used: Vocabulary, Similarities, 
Block Design, and Matrix Reasoning.  
8 
 
Scaled scores from published norms with defined mean scores and defined standard 
deviations (SD) were used for all neurocognitive test performance (Subtests neurocognitive 
domains: mean=10, SD=3; WASI: mean=100, SD=15).  
 
2.3  Statistics  
For the statistical analysis we used Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 
16.0. Pearson correlation tests were used for calculating correlations between BCIS subscales 
scores and neurocognitive test performance. Multiple regression analyses were employed to 
examine the relationships between independent variables and cognitive insight. Selection of 
variables in the regression model was based on correlation tests conducted in the present 
study between the BCIS subscales and variables with assumed clinical importance. The BCIS 
subscales self-reflectiveness and self-certainty were used to represent the outcome - cognitive 
insight. A linear regression model was employed to search for unique contributions in 
explained variance in self-reflectiveness and self-certainty after potential confounders had 
been statistically eliminated. The independent variables in the regression model did not 
intercorrelate significantly, except for the relationships attention - full scale IQ (r=0.52, 
p<0.001) and insight of illness - depression (r=0.31, p=0.002). The independent variables 
were entered one at a time in the sequential regression analysis except for full scale IQ and 
verbal learning. To calculate the unique contribution by neurocognitive measures these 
independent variables were entered together in a final block (stepwise analysis). The model 
was examined for non-linear relationships between the independent and the dependant 
variables.  
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Few patients had missing data in the study. On an average there were 1.0 and 0.8 total 
missing registrations per item on the instruments BCIS and IS respectively. The 
neurocognitive assessments were complete except for 5 missing registrations on the subtest 
Logical Memory.  
 
  
3.  Results 
3.1 Cognitive insight and neurocognitive test performance 
The scores on self-reflectiveness, self-certainty and the neuropsychological subtests are 
shown in table 2. The group performs within the lower-normal range compared to published 
norms. Processing speed was the most impaired cognitive domain, whereas verbal fluency 
and full scale IQ were the two least affected functions. No significant correlations were found 
between self-reflectiveness and any of the neurocognitive subtests. Self-certainty showed a 
significant negative correlation with both verbal learning and full scale IQ (table 3).  
 
 
    Table 2 
    
    
    Table 3 
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3.2  Explained variance in cognitive insight 
3.2.1  Self-reflectiveness  
Insight of illness and delusions were the only independent variables which correlated 
significantly with self-reflectiveness. In the regression analysis both variables contributed 
significantly to explain the variance in self-reflectiveness. Insight of illness explained 12.4 % 
of the variability, whereas additional 3.0 % were explained by delusions.  
  
3.2.2  Self-certainty 
Verbal learning significantly added to explained variance of self-certainty after contributions 
by insight of illness, depression and delusions had been controlled for. Insight of illness, 
delusions and verbal learning explained 9.5, 5.0 and 4.6 % of the variance respectively (table 
4).   
 
 
Table 4 
 
 
4.  Discussion 
The main findings of the present study in schizophrenia were significant relationships 
between self-certainty and both verbal learning and IQ indicating that the higher the IQ or 
verbal learning score, the better the cognitive insight as measured by reduced self-certainty. 
Verbal learning significantly added to the explained variance in self-certainty after 
contributions by insight of illness, depression and delusions had been taken into account. We 
found no association between self-reflectiveness and neurocognition.  
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The neurocognitive performance of the patients in the present study was consistent with 
scores in a recent meta-analysis (Dickinson et al., 2007). Processing speed was the most 
impaired cognitive domain, whereas verbal fluency and full scale IQ were the two least 
affected functions. The relationship between neurocognition and cognitive insight was 
studied in patients with first episode psychosis by Buchy and associates (Lepage et al., 
2008;Buchy et al., 2009a), who found that verbal learning and memory were positively 
associated with self-reflectiveness and negatively associated with self-certainty. Hence, the 
findings in the present study are in line with the previously found negative association 
between self-certainty and verbal learning and memory, but in contrast to the finding 
regarding self-reflectiveness and verbal learning and memory. Yet, to our knowledge, our 
study is the first to report on cognitive insight and neurocognition taking other clinical 
characteristics into account.  
 
Self-certainty measures “confidence in own beliefs”. As flexibility of thought and use of 
corrective feedback are essential to general intellectual abilities, a negative association 
between self-certainty and IQ was anticipated. In the present study we found a significant 
negative correlation between the two, yet, IQ did not contribute uniquely to self-certainty. 
Verbal learning, on the other hand, made a specific contribution in explaining self-certainty 
independently of potential confounders. Hence, our data suggests that the role of verbal 
learning impairments on confidence in own beliefs is not confounded by insight of illness, 
depression or delusions. Interestingly, in a study by Brebion and colleagues depression 
seemed to be the main predictor of verbal memory (Brebion et al., 2001). This finding taken 
together with the significant negative correlation between depression and self-certainty found 
in the present study further underscores the association of verbal learning to self-certainty. 
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The contribution by verbal learning is almost unaltered before and after controlling for the 
clinical features. Hence, the current findings may lead to some speculations about the 
relationship between verbal learning and self-certainty. Possibly, a level of immediate 
learning is needed to evaluate own aberrant ideas and to apply self-correction strategies. 
Individuals with impairments in verbal learning may have difficulties with the continuous 
comparison and adjustment between acquired learned material and held beliefs, and, thus, 
alternative explanations may not be sufficiently facilitated causing enhanced restricted bias 
towards oneself. 
 
Our study has limitations due to cross-sectional design. Future longitudinal studies with 
assessment of cognitive insight, delusions and memory performance, in addition to reasoning 
style could shed further light on the role of cognitive insight in formation of delusions and 
clarify whether self-reflectiveness and self-certainty essentially are state or trait phenomena.  
 
In conclusion, we found that high self-certainty - a dimension of cognitive insight - is 
associated with poor verbal learning and low IQ in schizophrenia. Verbal learning seems to 
make a unique contribution in explaining the variability in self-certainty, also when taking 
potential confounders such as depression and positive symptoms into account.  
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Tables 
 
 
 
       
           Table 1. Demographic and clinical characteristics 
  
                         Mean   (SD) 
 
  Male, %                         58.8                  
   
  Ethnicity,  % Caucasian 
         
                        73.5 
   
  Illicit drugs last 6  months, %                         33.3 
 
  Age (y)                         32.6 (9.9) 
 
  Illness duration (y)                           3.6 (5.7) 
 
  Education (y)  
        
                        12.0 (2.3) 
  
  GAFs 
  
                        40.4 (10.5) 
 
  GAFf                         41.0 (10.3) 
 
  PANSS delusions 
 
               3.3 (1.7) 
 
  PANSS hallucinations 
 
               2.9 (1.6) 
 
  PANSS positive sum                           5.5 (5.4) 
 
  PANSS negative sum                         15.2 (6.4) 
      
  PANSS depression 
                      
                          3.0 (1.5) 
         
  Birchwood Insight Scale total  
   
                          7.3 (2.5) 
N=102 for all variables except for illness duration, n=99.  Mean with standard 
deviation (SD) presented. For male, ethnicity and illicit drugs last 6 months  per 
cent of patients are presented. Global Assessment of Functioning was used to assess 
global level of symptoms and global level of functioning (GAF-s and GAF-f). 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) was utilized to measure level of 
delusions, hallucinations and depression. PANSS positive and negative subscale 
scores were also presented. 
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Table 2. Cognitive insight and neurocognitive test performance 
                 
                Mean (SD) 
              
              
 
            Rang 
      (min – max) 
 
  Self-reflectiveness                                   13.9  (4.8) 
 
 
 
            4-25 
 
  Self-certainty                   8.4 (2.9)               
 
            3-17  
   
   Verbal learning                   8.1 (2.6)               
 
            1-16 
   
   Processing speed                   6.5 (2.2)               
 
            3-13 
      
   Attention                         7.8 (1.8)               
 
             4-12 
   
   Verbal fluency                   9.1 (3.6)               
 
             1-19 
  
   Inhibition                   6.9 (3.7)               
 
             1-14 
   
   Full scale IQ                 98.5 (14.5)              
 
           71-130 
 
N=97 for verbal learning, for all other variables n=102. Neuropsychological tests used: Verbal 
learning: Logical Memory, subtest from Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-III). Processing speed: Digit 
Symbol Test from Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III). Attention: Digit Span from WAIS-
III. Verbal fluency: Verbal Fluency Letter Test from the Delis Kaplan Executive Functioning Scale 
(D-KEFS). Inhibition: Color-Word Interference Test from D-KEFS. Full scale IQ: Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). Scaled scores from published norms with defined mean and 
standard deviation (SD) used (neuropsychological tests: mean=10, SD=3. WASI: mean=100, SD=15 
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Table 3. Correlation coefficients between cognitive insight and demographic 
variables, clinical characteristics and neurocognitive test performance 
 
            Self-reflectiveness  
           _______________ 
 
                 Self-certainty 
           ________________ 
 
               r                     p               r                        p 
 
 
   Gender 
 
            -0.06 
 
    0.57 
 
         -0.09 
 
     0.39 
 
   Age  
 
            -0.09 
 
    0.36 
 
          0.06 
 
     0.55 
 
    Illness duration 
 
             0.07 
 
    0.50 
 
          0.05 
 
     0.63 
 
   Clinical insight 
 
             0.36 
 
 <0.001 
 
         -0.32 
 
     0.001 
  
   Depression 
 
             0.04 
 
    0.70 
 
         -0.21 
 
     0.031 
 
   Delusions 
 
            -0.26 
 
   0.009 
 
          0.28 
 
     0.005 
    
   Hallucinations 
 
            -0.04 
 
    0.70 
 
          0.07 
 
     0.46 
 
    Verbal learning 
 
           -0.06 
  
    0.58 
 
        -0.28 
 
     0.006 
    
    Processing speed 
 
           -0.03 
 
    0.73 
 
        -0.06 
 
     0.57 
    
    Attention 
 
            0.16 
   
    0.12 
 
        -0.12 
 
     0.24 
    
    Verbal fluency 
 
           -0.11 
 
    0.27 
 
        -0.02 
 
     0.81 
   
   Inhibition 
 
            0.08 
 
    0.44 
 
        -0.12 
 
     0.24 
    
    Full scale IQ  
 
            0.09 
 
    0.38 
 
        -0.21 
 
     0.035 
 
N=97 for verbal learning, for all other variables n=102. Pearson correlation test used. Clinical insight 
assessed with Birchwood Insight Scale. Depression and delusions assessed with Positive and Negative 
Syndrome Scale (PANSS depression, PANSS delusions, PANSS hallucinations). Neuropsychological 
tests used: Verbal learning: Logical Memory, subtest from Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-III). 
Processing speed: Digit Symbol Test from from Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III). 
Attention: Digit Span from WAIS-III. Verbal fluency: Verbal Fluency Letter Test from the Delis 
Kaplan Executive Functioning Scale (D-KEFS). Inhibition: Color-Word Interference Test from D-
KEFS. Full scale IQ: Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). Scaled scores from 
published norms with defined mean and standard deviation (SD) used (neuropsychological tests: 
mean=10, SD=3. WASI: mean=100, SD=15). 
 

